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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Effectiveness of Environmental Conservation and Water Management 
Policies.  
(August 2012) 
Mariano Mezzatesta, B.S.; M.S., The University of Texas at Austin 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. David A. Newburn 
 Dr. Richard T. Woodward 
 
An awareness of the effect of agricultural production on the environment has led to the 
development of policies to mitigate its adverse effects. This dissertation provides 
analyses of agri-environmental policies designed to protect environmental assets, as well 
as analytical decision-making tools useful for conducting policy evaluations.  
The first essay employs propensity score matching techniques to estimate the 
additionality of federal agricultural conservation programs for six conservation practices 
for farmers in Ohio. Additionality is an important measure of the effectiveness of 
conservation programs in inducing an increase in the conservation effort of farmers. 
Results suggest that additionality is positive and statistically significant for all six 
conservation practices. However, while programs achieve positive additionality for all 
practice types, a comparison between conservation practices reveals that certain practice 
types achieve higher percent additionality than others. Such results, coupled with 
information on the environmental benefits obtained per practice, could prove useful to 
program managers for improving the effectiveness of conservation programs. 
 iv 
The second essay develops a new methodology to decompose the additionality 
measure into the two effects induced by conservation programs: expansion versus the 
new adoption of conservation practices. To do so, the relative contributions of two types 
of farmers, prior-adopters and new-adopters, are estimated. Results of the decomposition 
reveal that the additionality for prior-adopters is not significant for all practice types. 
Instead, additional conservation effort comes from new-adopters adopting new practices. 
Second, decomposition estimates suggest that practice types with a greater fraction of 
enrolled farmers that are new-adopters achieve greater percent additionality than those 
with greater proportions of prior-adopters. This suggests that a farmers‘ history in 
conservation adoption has a significant influence on additionality levels. 
The final essay analyzes the effect of recent instream flow diversion-guidelines 
on agricultural water security and streamflows within a decentralized water management 
regime. Spatially-explicit economic and hydrologic models are integrated to evaluate the 
tradeoffs between salmon bypass-flows and agricultural water security for three different 
diversion-guidelines within a northern-California watershed. Results indicate that the 
most restrictive diversion-guideline provides the greatest protection of bypass-flow days 
within smaller watersheds; however, within larger watersheds protection is not as 
significant. Water security, however, decreases sharply under the strict and moderate 
diversion-guidelines, especially during dry years. Overall, results indicate that greater 
focus should be given to protecting streamflows in the smallest watersheds, and meeting 
human water needs during dry years, when agricultural water security is impacted the 
most. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The impact of the agricultural sector on the environment is well known. Agricultural 
production, for instance, reduces water quality through nutrient and sediment runoff, 
impairs instream flows through surface water diversions for irrigation, diminishes 
natural habitat through deforestation, and potentially leads to an increase in GHG 
emissions. A growing awareness of the effect of agricultural production on the 
environment has led to the development of programs and policies to mitigate its adverse 
effects. For example, the use of markets and subsidy programs to incentivize voluntary, 
private investment by farmers in environmental stewardship has been gaining popularity 
for many years (USDA ERS 2009). The importance of instream flows in sustaining 
aquatic ecosystems has also led to the development of water management policies that 
restrict surface flow diversions, and thus, reduce the impacts of agricultural production 
on water resources (Richter et al. 2003). The challenge of reconciling competing needs 
between agriculture and ecosystems for natural resources requires effective and 
innovative agri-environmental policies. As the adoption of agri-environmental policies 
to address environmental concerns increases, analysis of existing policies is crucial to 
understanding the effectiveness and impacts of such policies, as well as for determining 
areas for improvement. 
 The overarching contribution of this dissertation is to provide analyses and  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Land Economics. 
 2 
insights into agri-environmental programs and policies designed to enhance or protect 
environmental assets, as well as to introduce analytical decision-making tools that can be 
useful to policy-makers in conducting policy analyses. The three essays that comprise 
this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Additionality and the Adoption of Farm Conservation Practices; 
2. The Decomposition of Additionality; and, 
3. The Effect of Instream Flow Policies on Agricultural Water Security and 
Streamflows. 
Essay I, or Chapter II, employs propensity score matching techniques to estimate 
the additionality (i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)) of federal 
agricultural conservation programs for six conservation practices. Federal agricultural 
conservation programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the 
Environmental Quality Improvement Program (EQIP), have invested billions of dollars 
to incentivize farmers to enhance environmental benefits. The effectiveness of such 
federal cost-share programs depends in part on whether payments induce an increase in 
conservation effort by farmers (i.e., additionality).  Estimates of additionality allow for a 
more thorough understanding of how incentives in conservation programs alter farmer 
behavior, and assist in designing programs that cost-effectively enhance environmental 
benefits. Data on six conservation practices as well as farmer adoption and enrollment 
decisions within several conservation programs, were obtained from a survey conducted 
in Ohio.  
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Essay II, or Chapter III, develops a new methodology to analyze two types of 
effects that conservation programs can have on farmers. Conservation programs can lead 
to either the expansion of existing conservation practices, or the new adoption of 
conservation practices. To achieve this, the additionality measure (ATT) is decomposed 
into the relative contributions of two types of farmers: prior-adopters and new-adopters. 
The term ―new-adopters‖ refers to those farmers who adopt a new practice, i.e., those 
who would have not adopted a conservation practice without the assistance of a program 
subsidy. On the other hand, ―prior-adopters‖ refers to those farmers who would have 
adopted the practice even in the absence of a subsidy, and thus, potentially expand the 
practice as a result of program support. The disaggregation of the ATT provides a more 
thorough understanding of additionality, and reveals greater insights into cost-share 
programs. The new methodology is used to decompose the overall additionality 
estimates obtained in Essay I, which are an aggregate measure of additionality across the 
two types of farmers. 
Essay III or Chapter IV, analyzes the effect of recent instream flow policies, 
which aim to maintain minimum-bypass-flows for adult salmonid migration, on 
agricultural water security and streamflows within a decentralized water management 
regime. Water use conflicts have become a dominant environmental issue, particularly in 
arid climates, such as the Western U.S., where the listing of endangered species has 
placed greater pressures on regulatory agencies to protect instream flows. In response, 
regulatory agencies have adopted instream flow polices requiring that certain levels of 
streamflow be maintained in an effort to protect flows. While restrictions on surface 
 4 
flow diversions to maintain instream flows can assist in protecting aquatic ecosystems, it 
is important to understand the inherent tradeoffs between environmental protections and 
agricultural water security. Within the Western U.S., the challenge of reconciling 
competing water needs is well exemplified, where flow regime alterations from water 
management have been a primary driver of ecosystem degradation (Dole and Niemi 
2004). Agricultural producers within this area often rely on a decentralized management 
system, based on groundwater wells and/or privately-owned storage ponds filled with 
water from run-off and surface water diversions, rather than on more traditional releases 
from large dams (Merenlender et al. 2008; Grantham et al. 2010; Newburn et al. 2011). 
Spatially-explicit economic and hydrologic models are integrated to quantify the 
tradeoffs between losses in ecologically-relevant flow metrics and impacts on 
agricultural water security under different instream flow policies within a northern-
California watershed, accounting for spatial and temporal variation in water availability. 
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CHAPTER II  
ADDITIONALITY AND THE ADOPTION OF FARM CONSERVATION 
PRACTICES   
 
2.1 Introduction 
Federal agricultural conservation programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) and the Environmental Quality Improvement Program (EQIP), have invested 
billions of dollars to incentivize farmers to enhance environmental benefits. Funding for 
major USDA conservation programs was approximately 24 billion dollars during the 
period 2002-2007, and, starting in 2002, the portion allocated to working-lands programs 
have increased considerably relative to land retirement programs (USDA ERS 2009). 
The effectiveness of federal cost-share programs depends in part on whether payments 
induce an increase in farmer conservation effort. In this chapter, propensity score 
matching methods are used to estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in cost-
share programs for six conservation practices. 
Propensity score matching estimators were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) and are often used for program evaluation to estimate the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT), i.e. the average impact on those who are directly affected by the 
policy. Matching estimators pair treated and untreated individuals that are similar in 
terms of observable characteristics in order to correct for sample selection bias induced 
by nonrandom program enrollment. These methods have been used for program 
evaluation in several contexts pertaining to conservation. For example, Andam et al. 
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(2008) analyzed the effect of protected areas in reducing deforestation rates in Costa 
Rica and found that the rate of deforestation in protected areas was 11% lower than in 
similar unprotected areas. Matching methods have been used to analyze the effect of 
land-use policies aimed at reducing farmland loss (Liu and Lynch 2011) and reducing 
future urban development (Bento et al. 2007; Butsic et al. 2011). Ferraro et al. (2007) 
used matching methods to analyze the impact of the US Endangered Species Act on 
species recovery rates and found significant improvements in recovery rates but only 
when the listing was combined with substantial government funding for habitat 
protection.  
While the studies mentioned above focused primarily on programs or polices that 
protect against future land-use conversion, federal cost-share programs incentivize the 
adoption of conservation practices for land restoration. Using regression analysis to 
analyze the effect of CRP on land retirement, Lubowski et al. (2008) estimate a discrete 
choice land-use change model with Natural Resource Inventory data where CRP is 
included as an alternative. They found that approximately 90% of land enrolled under 
CRP constitutes additional land retirement, implying that CRP significantly increased 
the likelihood of land retirement. Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez (2011) estimated the 
impact on land allocation of a cost-share program in Maryland using a switching 
regression model. They found that cost-share funding induced farmers to adopt 
conservation practices they would not have used without funding; however, it also had 
the unintended consequence of inducing slippage (i.e., pasture and vegetative cover 
converted to cropland).  
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In this chapter, I estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in cost-share 
programs for six conservation practices. I apply matching estimators to quantify 
additionality, estimated as the ATT, which equals the average increase in conservation 
effort of enrolled farmers with funding relative to their counterfactual effort without 
funding.
1
 I analyze conservation adoption and enrollment decisions using data from a 
farmer survey in Ohio. The survey includes farmer enrollment in major federal 
conservation programs, such as CRP, EQIP, and others. I estimate the ATT for six 
conservation practice types: conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfield establishment, 
grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips. Conservation tillage leaves crop residue 
on fields to reduce soil erosion and runoff. Cover crops provide soil cover and absorb 
nutrients on cropland when the soil would otherwise be bare. Hayfield establishment 
retires cropland to a less intensive state to provide habitat and other conservation 
benefits. Grid sampling improves the efficiency of nutrient application rates to maximize 
crop yields, while reducing excess fertilizer that potentially would runoff or leach into 
surrounding water bodies. Grass waterways are located in the natural drainage areas 
within cropland to reduce soil erosion and gully formation. Filter strips are typically 
planted grass along stream banks to capture sediment, nutrients, and pesticides from 
runoff before they enter surrounding water bodies. 
The empirical analysis provides two main results. First, the overall ATT for 
enrollment in cost-share programs is positive and statistically significant for each of the 
                                                 
1
 The term counterfactual refers to what would or might have happened under different conditions. In this 
study, the counterfactual is what the conservation effort of an enrolled farmer would have been had they 
not enrolled. 
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six practice types. That is, cost-share programs induce farmers to increase the average 
proportion of conservation acreage adopted for all practices. Second, percent 
additionality is found to vary dramatically between practice types. Percent additionality 
is defined as the percent increase in the proportion of conservation acreage relative to the 
total proportion of conservation acreage adopted by enrolled farmers. The percent 
additionality is highest for hayfield establishment (92.9%), filter strips (89.1%), and 
cover crops (88.9%), while it is lowest for conservation tillage (20.5%). 
 The chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss the propensity score 
matching method and assumptions. Next, I describe and summarize the data from the 
farmer survey in Ohio. Thereafter, I provide the estimation results for the ATT, %ATT, 
and robustness checks. I conclude with policy implications for conservation programs. 
 
2.2 Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
In this section, I first formalize the ATT and discuss the identification assumptions. 
Then, I develop the propensity score matching estimator. The development is mostly 
standard in the literature, though I follow most closely the presentation of Smith and 
Todd (2005) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). An indicator variable D is equal to one 
if a farmer enrolled in a cost-share program to fund the adoption of a conservation 
practice, and D equals zero if a farmer did not enroll. Further, two potential outcome 
variables 1Y  and 0Y  are defined for each farmer and practice type. Let 1Y  be the 
proportion of farm acreage in the conservation practice if a farmer enrolled in a program 
(D=1), and let 0Y  be the proportion of farm acreage in the conservation practice if the 
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farmer did not enroll (D=0), where 00 1Y   and 10 1Y  . Only one of these two 
outcome variables is observable for any given farmer. 
The treatment effect of enrollment in a cost-share program is defined as the 
increase in the proportion of conservation acreage adopted with program enrollment 
relative to the proportion without being enrolled, 1 0Y Y   . Additionality is defined as 
the average treatment effect on the treated (enrolled) group of farmers 
      1 0 1 0| 1 | 1 | 1 .ATT E Y Y D E Y D E Y D        [2.1] 
The application of matching estimators to estimate the ATT requires that two 
identification assumptions be satisfied. The first, often called the unconfoundedness 
assumption, states that the potential outcome 0Y  must be independent of program 
enrollment conditional on the set of observable covariates X, i.e., 0 |Y D X  (Heckman 
et al. 1997). The vector of covariates X should affect both the farmer decision on 
enrollment and the potential outcomes. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrated that 
if the unconfoundedness assumption is satisfied, then it is also true that 0Y  is 
independent of program enrollment conditional on the propensity score, i.e., 0 |Y D P , 
where the propensity score is defined as the probability of enrollment conditional on X, 
 1|P P D X  . The propensity scores are often estimated using discrete choice 
models, typically a probit or logit model. 
The second identification assumption states that for all farmer characteristics X, 
there is a positive probability for both enrolled or non-enrolled farmers, i.e.,  
 10 
 0 1| 1P D X   . This overlap assumption, also known as the common support 
condition, implies that for each enrolled farmer there exists a positive probability of a 
match within the group of non-enrolled farmers with a similar set of covariates X. 
Let H1 denote the set of I enrollees and H0 the set of J non-enrollees that are on 
common support. Each enrollee and non-enrollee has a vector of characteristics, iX  and 
jX , and propensity scores, iP  and jP , respectively, where i=1,...,I and j=1,…,J. 
Propensity scores on the probability of enrollment are estimated from a probit model, 
such that  1|i i iP P D X   for 1i H  and  1|j j jP P D X   for 0j H . 
The primary goal of the matching process is to obtain for all iH1, a 
counterfactual estimate, 
0
ˆ iY , of what the enrolled farmer would have done without cost-
share funding. The counterfactual estimate, 
0
ˆ iY , is a weighted average 
  
0
0 0 0
ˆ ˆ | , 1 , ,i i ji i
j H
Y E Y P D W i j Y

       [2.2] 
where 0
jY  is the observed outcome for the non-enrollee jH0.
2
 A variety of matching 
algorithms are available to construct the weights  ,W i j  in [2.2] (Guo and Fraser 2010).  
For example, the propensity score kernel matching uses the non-enrollees in H0 as 
matches, and the weights  ,W i j  are determined based on a kernel function, a 
                                                 
2
 The expression 
0
ˆ | , 1i i iE Y P D    denotes the empirical estimate of 0 | , 1
i
i iE Y P D   . Refer to 
Smith and Todd (2005) for further clarification on this expression. 
 11 
bandwidth parameter, and the differences between iP  and jP . The weights are 
normalized so that  
0
, 1
j H
W i j

  for each enrolled farmer i. The matching estimators 
for  1 | 1E Y D   and  0 | 1E Y D   in equation [2.1] are 
  
1
1 1
1ˆ | 1 i
i H
E Y D Y
I 
    [2.3] 
and 
    
1 1 0
0 0 0
1 1ˆ ˆ| 1 , .i j
i H i H j H
E Y D Y W i j Y
I I  
      [2.4] 
Hence, the matching estimator for the ATT in equation [2.1] is 
  
1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1ˆ ˆ , .i i i j
i H i H j H
ATT Y Y Y W i j Y
I I  
 
      
 
    [2.5] 
 
2.3 Data in the Farmer Survey 
For this study, data is used from a farmer survey conducted in southwestern Ohio within 
25 counties in and around the Great Miami River Watershed. The study area is 
dominated by agricultural uses (83% of land area) particularly for row-crop production 
in corn, soybeans, and wheat. Typical livestock operations include swine, beef cattle, 
and dairy. The survey was conducted in 2009 by the Ohio Division of the National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) (the questionnaire used to conduct the survey is 
provided in Appendix C). The sample of farmers was drawn from the NASS master list 
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of farmers, where a random stratified sampling was used to ensure a sufficient number of 
responses from large commercial farms. The questionnaire was mailed to 2000 farmers 
with follow-up phone calls. There were a total of 773 survey respondents. However, 
useable responses varied by practice type depending on whether the farmer completed 
the questionnaire for each practice type. The questionnaire contained questions on 
farmer socioeconomic characteristics, farm management and operation, and land quality 
characteristics.  
The questionnaire also included information on the acreage adopted for the 
following six conservation practices in 2009: conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfield 
(or grassland) establishment, grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips. These six 
practices are categorized into two groups. First, practices for environmentally sensitive 
areas (filter strips and grass waterways) are almost exclusively used along stream banks 
or in natural drainage areas, respectively. Second, field practices (conservation tillage, 
cover crops, hayfield establishment, and grid sampling) are often adopted as a practice 
for a significant portion of the cropland. 
For each of the six conservation practices, the questionnaire asks whether the 
farmer received funding from enrollment in any cost-share programs. Federal programs 
included explicitly in the survey are EQIP, CRP, Conservation Reserve Enhancement 
Program (CREP), and Conservation Security Program (CSP).
3
 The Great Miami River 
Watershed has a regional water quality trading program (WQTP) (Newburn and 
Woodward, forthcoming). The WQTP was included in the survey because it similarly 
                                                 
3
 The CSP later changed its name to the Conservation Stewardship Program.   
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provides cost-share funding for conservation practices. An ―other‖ option was also 
included in the survey to capture any other federal or state conservation programs not 
already listed above, such as wetland and grasslands programs.   
Table 2-1 reports farmer decisions on conservation practice adoption and 
program enrollment for the six practice types. Farmer decisions are categorized into 
three groups: no adoption, adoption without enrollment, and adoption with enrollment. 
For example, conservation tillage has 97 farmers who did not adopt this practice, 379 
farmers who adopted without enrollment (i.e., self-funded), and 87 farmers who enrolled 
in a cost-share program for this practice. Table 2-1 also provides the average proportion 
for the conservation acreage adopted relative to the total farm acreage for enrolled 
farmers and non-enrolled farmers who adopted a practice. Non-enrolled farmers who did 
not adopt a practice have an average proportion of zero for this practice. The average 
proportion of conservation acreage adopted by enrolled farmers is greater than that by 
non-enrolled farmers who adopted a practice for all practices except for grass 
waterways, where the average proportions are equal (Table 2-1). Notice that the average 
proportions for the four field practices are much larger than the two environmentally 
sensitive practices. The reason is that filter strips and grass waterways are solely 
implemented along stream banks and in natural drainage areas rather than across the 
entire field, and thus, represent a smaller proportion of total farm acreage. 
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TABLE 2-1. Farmer Adoption, Enrollment, and Average Proportion of Conservation 
Acreage Adopted on Total Farm Acreage by Practice Type. 
              
Practice Type 
No 
Adoption 
Adoption 
without 
Enrollment 
Adoption 
with 
Enrollment 
Totala 
Average 
Proportion for 
Non-Enrolled 
who Adopted 
Average 
Proportion for 
Enrolled 
Conservation Tillage 97 379 87 563 0.695 0.779 
Cover Crops 513 68 24 605 0.197 0.262 
Hayfield Establishment 522 53 19 594 0.153 0.287 
Grid Sampling 323 161 55 539 0.636 0.749 
Grass Waterways 243 137 146 526 0.018 0.018 
Filter Strips 395 56 93 544 0.008 0.011 
a There were a total of 773 survey respondents; however, the number of useable observations varies by practice type 
due to missing or incomplete survey information. 
 
 
For the empirical analysis, the treatment group for a given practice type is 
comprised of farmers who enrolled in any cost-share program for this practice, while the 
control group is comprised of farmers who did not enroll in any program for this 
practice. Table 2-2 summarizes farmer enrollment in the cost-share programs. CRP was 
the dominant funding source for enrolled farmers who adopted grass waterways and 
hayfield establishment.  However, there was not a single dominant funding source for 
enrolled farmers who adopted conservation tillage, filter strips, cover crops, or grid 
sampling.  Enrollment in the Great Miami WQTP represents only a small fraction of 
overall enrollment in Table 2-2 because this program was still in a pilot phase in 2009. 
The CSP rules are known to allow cost-share funding for both new and existing 
conservation practices. As such, CSP funds may be directed towards subsidizing 
conservation effort that is not additional. As a robustness check, I examine whether the 
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estimation results for ATT differ significantly between CSP and all other programs, as 
discussed below in the results section. 
 
TABLE 2-2. Farmer Enrollment in Cost-Share Programs by Practice Type. 
         Practice Type CRP CSP EQIP CREP WQTP OTHER TOTAL 
Conservation Tillage 24 36 16 1 5 11 93 
Cover Crops 2 3 6 0 6 4 21 
Hayfield Establishment 13 1 1 2 0 1 18 
Grid Sampling 3 21 13 1 2 6 46 
Grass Waterways 89 15 10 6 3 15 138 
Filter Strips 48 15 8 18 1 8 98 
Total 179 91 54 28 17 45   
Note: Total enrollment values in Table 2-2 do not match exactly those in Table 2-1 because certain farmers 
did not report in which program(s) they enrolled, and certain farmers reported enrolling in more than one 
program for a practice. 
 
 
Tables A-1 through A-6 (Appendix A) provide the summary statistics of the 
covariates, prior to matching, for enrolled and non-enrolled farmers for all practices. T-
test statistics on the differences in the covariate sample means for the two groups are 
also included. For example, for the grid sampling practice, the sample mean of the 
dummy variable on education exceeding high school is 0.655 for enrolled farmers and 
0.413 for non-enrolled farmers, which is significantly different at the 99% level (Table 
A-4). Other covariates, including farm revenue, farm horizon, acres in grain, and farm 
size are also statistically different in their means for enrolled and non-enrolled farmers. 
Similarly, the other five practice types exhibit statistically significant differences in the 
sample means of several covariates before matching is conducted.  
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Propensity scores are estimated for each practice type using a probit model, 
where the dependent variable is the enrollment decision and the covariates X are used as 
explanatory variables. The estimated probit coefficients for grid sampling are provided 
in Table 2-3, where the covariates used in the estimation are those in Table A-4. The 
covariates for grid sampling that are significant are the proportion in grain crop, high 
slope, and education exceeding high school. The significance of covariates in the probit 
estimation varied by practice type (refer to Tables A-7 through A-11). For example, for 
grass waterways the covariates medium and high income, proportion in grain crop, 
medium slope, high slope, farm size, and stream adjacency are all significant at the 95% 
level or higher (Table A-10).By contrast, for filter strips, proportion in grain crop, stream 
adjacency, farm revenue, and education are significant at the 99% level (Table A-11).   
The application of propensity score matching requires that the covariates are 
balanced given the propensity score (Deheija and Wahba, 1999). To test whether the 
covariates are balanced conditional on the propensity score, the probit model 
specification for each practice type was evaluated using the balancing algorithm 
explained in Becker and Ichino (2002). This test divides farmers into strata based on 
equal intervals of the estimated propensity score. Within each stratum, a test is 
conducted to assess whether there is a significant difference between the means for each 
covariate for enrolled and non-enrolled farmers. The probit model specification for each 
practice type satisfied the balancing test for all covariates. 
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TABLE 2-3. Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
for Cost-Share Enrollment in Grid Sampling. 
   
Variable 
Estimated 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
Farm Revenue 0.178 0.229 
Farm Horizon 0.737 0.382 
Age 0.009 0.011 
Experience     -0.009 0.010 
Education    0.566** 0.168 
Soil Type: Loam or Sandy 0.103 0.188 
Medium Income 0.251 0.256 
High Income 0.115 0.274 
Rented 0.014 0.267 
Grain Crops   1.879* 0.844 
Medium Slope 0.343 0.234 
High Slope     1.473** 0.555 
Farm Size 0.209 0.140 
Stream      -0.184 0.168 
Livestock 0.049 0.178 
Constant   -5.871** 1.288 
Log Likelihood  -152.439   
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
 
 
2.4 Estimation Results 
In this section, I provide and discuss the estimation results on additionality for the six 
conservation practices. Table 2-4 provides the estimates for the overall ATT and %ATT 
for all practice types. The estimation in Table 2-4 is performed using propensity score 
kernel matching with the Gaussian kernel type, where the common support requirement 
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is enforced and the kernel bandwidth is 0.06.
4
 Covariates were verified to be balanced 
across matched groups of enrollees and non-enrollees using a two-group t-test that 
checks for differences in the covariate means across the two groups. All covariates were 
balanced successfully for all practice types at the 95% level.
5
 The standard errors and 
95% confidence intervals (CI) were generated using a bootstrap procedure based on 
1,000 simulations.
6
  
In Table 2-4, the overall ATT is estimated based on equation [2.5]. The %ATT in 
Table 2-4 is the ratio of the overall ATT in equation [2.5] to the  1 | 1E Y D   in equation 
[2.3] 
 
 1
% 100 .
| 1
ATT
ATT
E Y D
 

 [2.6] 
Note that the overall ATT is equal to    1 0| 1 | 1E Y D E Y D   , which therefore has an 
upper bound of  1 | 1E Y D  . The %ATT can be interpreted as the percentage increase in 
the proportion of conservation acreage relative to the total proportion of conservation 
                                                 
4
 Two common support conditions are imposed in Stata to reduce poor quality matches. First, I used the 
common support condition that drops enrolled farmers whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the non-enrolled farmers (control group). Second, 
I used the 2% trimming condition that drops 2% of the enrolled farmers where the propensity score density 
of the control observations is the lowest. 
5
 Refer to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for more information on the covariate balancing test using a two-
group t-test. 
6
 An analytical formula for the standard error of the propensity score kernel matching estimator is not 
available (refer to Abadie and Imbens (2006; 2008)). As such, a bootstrapping procedure is used based on 
1,000 random draws from the data set of farmers, with replacement and using the same number of farmers 
in each draw equal to the number in the original data set. The 95% bootstrapped CI consists of the 26
th
 and 
975
th
 largest parameter estimates. 
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acreage adopted by enrolled farmers. The %ATT is thus equal to the percent 
additionality. 
 
TABLE 2-4. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and % ATT using Propensity 
Score Kernel Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.06). 
  
    Conservation Tillage Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.1600 0.0321 0.0910 0.2166 
% ATT 20.5 3.6 12.3 26.5 
Matched enrolled farmers = 86, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 476 
Cover Crops Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2327 0.0472 0.1449 0.3273 
% ATT 88.9 5.7 76.5 94.3 
Matched enrolled farmers = 24, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 581 
Hayfield Establishment Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2274 0.0660 0.0741 0.3435 
% ATT 92.9 5.0 78.3 96.4 
Matched enrolled farmers = 18, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 575 
Grid Sampling Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.5032 0.0514 0.3780 0.5827 
% ATT 66.3 4.7 54.8 72.9 
Matched enrolled farmers = 54, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 484 
Grass Waterways Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0120 0.0023 0.0079 0.0165 
% ATT 65.0 6.1 51.3 75.1 
Matched enrolled farmers = 144, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 380 
Filter Strips Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0101 0.0020 0.0065 0.0141 
% ATT 89.1 5.3 75.8 95.7 
Matched enrolled farmers = 92, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 451 
 
  
The overall ATT is positive and statistically significant for all six practices 
(Table 2-4). That is, the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals on ATT for each of the 
six practice types does not contain zero. This suggests that enrollment in cost-share 
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programs achieves a significantly positive level of additionality for each practice type. 
The ATT values in Table 2-4 are higher for field practices than those for 
environmentally sensitive areas. This is not surprising because filter strips and grass 
waterways are solely focused along stream banks and in natural drainage areas, and thus, 
represent a smaller proportion of the total farm acreage. Recall that the proportion of 
conservation acreage adopted by enrolled farmers is less than 0.02 for both filter strips 
and grass waterways (Table 2-1). 
To compare the level of additionality between practice types, the %ATT in 
equation [2.6] is used. The largest %ATT is found for hayfield establishment, filter 
strips, and cover crops with 92.9%, 89.1%, and 88.9%, respectively (Table 2-4). 
Moderate percent additionality was found for grid sampling and grass waterways with 
%ATT at 66.3% and 65.0%. Conservation tillage had the lowest percent additionality at 
only 20.5%. In sum, this suggests that while cost-share funding from enrollment in 
conservation programs achieve a positive ATT for all practice types, certain practice 
types achieve higher percent additionality than others.   
To test whether the %ATT values are statistically different across practice types, 
I construct bootstrapped confidence intervals of the difference in %ATT for all pairwise 
combinations of practice types (Table 2-5). For example, the difference in %ATT 
between cover crops relative to conservation tillage has a 95% bootstrapped confidence 
interval spanning lower and upper bounds of 55.0 % to 78.7%, respectively. This 
indicates that cover crops have a much higher %ATT than conservation tillage. 
Meanwhile, the difference in %ATT between cover crops and hayfield establishment is 
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not statistically significant from zero because the bootstrapped confidence interval spans 
from -16.0% to 11.9%. When comparing the two practice types for environmentally 
sensitive areas, filter strips have a statistically larger %ATT than grass waterways.   
 
TABLE 2-5. Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals for Pair-wise Differences in 
%ATT using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 
0.06) (Row minus Column). 
               
      
  
Conservation 
Tillage 
  
Cover Crops   
Hayfield 
Establishment 
  
Grid 
Sampling 
  
Grass 
Waterways 
  Filter Strips 
Conservation 
Tillage 
- 
 
[-78.7, -55.0]* 
 
[-80.5, -57.6]* 
 
[-55.8, -32.9]* 
 
[-58.1, -28.8]* 
 
[-79.7, -53.6]* 
Cover Crops   [55.0, 78.7]* 
 
- 
 
[-16.0, 11.9] 
 
[9.8, 36.5]* 
 
[7.1, 38.1]* 
 
[-13.8, 12.9] 
Hayfield 
Establishment 
  [57.6, 80.5]* 
 
[-11.9, 16.0] 
 
- 
 
[10.0, 37.5]* 
 
[9.4, 40.8]* 
 
 [-12.5, 16.1] 
Grid Sampling   [ 32.9, 55.8]* 
 
[-36.5,   -9.8]* 
 
[-37.5, -10.0]* 
 
- 
 
[-14.7, 14.4] 
 
 [-37.2, -8.7]* 
Grass 
Waterways 
  [28.8, 58.1]* 
 
[-38.1   -7.1]* 
 
[-40.8, -9.4]* 
 
[-14.4, 14.7] 
 
- 
 
 [-40.2, -7.4]* 
Filter Strips   [53.6, 79.7]*   [-12.9,   13.8]   [-16.1,  12.5]   [8.7,  37.2]*   [7.4,  40.2]*   - 
Note: * denotes statistical significance of the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
When evaluating whether to adopt a conservation field practice, farmers typically 
consider the impact such a practice would have on factors such as crop yields and 
operating costs. Hayfield establishment, for instance, would result in a complete loss in 
grain crop yields for the length of the enrollment contract. Meanwhile, conservation 
tillage often results in only modest changes in yields and may even lower operating costs 
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stemming from reduced fuel consumption. As such,  0 | 1E Y D   for conservation tillage 
should be greater than that for hayfield establishment. Consequently, the %ATT is more 
likely greater for hayfield establishment than for conservation tillage (refer to equation 
[2.6]). The results in Table 2-4, showing that %ATT is higher for hayfield establishment 
than for conservation tillage, is consistent with the expectation that there are higher 
opportunity costs from losses in yield for hayfield establishment than for conservation 
tillage, and thus, hayfield establishment achieves greater percent additionality. 
 
2.5 Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check to the estimation results presented in Table 2-4, the ATT and 
%ATT are estimated using a variety of matching estimators that differ in the model 
specifications on the weights. Specifically, I conduct sensitivity analysis on the 
estimation results for all combinations of the following specifications: two matching 
methods (kernel and local linear), two kernel functions (Gaussian and Epanechnikov), 
and four bandwidths (bandwidths =  0.02, 0.06,  0.1, and 0.15).
7
 This yields a total of 
sixteen different model specifications. The various model specifications provide a 
tradeoff between bias and variance. For instance, smaller (larger) bandwidth typically 
results in lower (higher) bias because it provides more weight to controls that are higher 
                                                 
7
 In addition to kernel and local linear matching, nearest-neighbor matching is another commonly used 
model specification. However, Abadie and Imbens (2006; 2008) explain that bootstrapped standard errors 
are not valid for nearest-neighbor matching with a fixed number of neighbors, and then further explain that 
kernel-based matching, for which the number of matches increase with sample size, has estimators that are 
asymptotically linear, and thus expect that the bootstrapped standard errors provide valid inferences. For 
this reason, I focus on the kernel and local linear matching estimators. 
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quality matches, but higher (lower) variance because less information is used to 
construct the counterfactual for each enrolled farmer. As an example, the estimation 
results for propensity score kernel matching with the Gaussian kernel function and a 
bandwidth of 0.02 are provided in Table A-12 (Appendix A); this is analogous to Table 
2-4 except the smaller bandwidth of 0.02 is used instead of 0.06.  
The main results in Table 2-4 are generally robust across all the model 
specifications. First, the overall ATT is positive and significant for every practice type 
across all sixteen model specifications. Second, the %ATT for each practice are similar 
in magnitude to the results in Table 2-4 across all model specifications, varying 
generally by less than 5%. The %ATT results also maintain the same ordering for three 
groups of practices. In Table A-12, for example, the largest %ATT estimates are 
hayfield establishment (91.1%), filter strips (89.6%), and cover crops (84.8%); the 
moderate %ATT estimates are grid sampling (66.7%) and grass waterways (65.5%); and 
the lowest %ATT is conservation tillage (17.3%). 
Similarly, I analyzed the robustness of the bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
the pairwise difference in %ATT between practice types using the same sixteen model 
specifications on the weights described above. Again as an example, Table A-13 
(Appendix A) provides the bootstrapped differences in %ATT when using the propensity 
score kernel with Gaussian function and bandwidth of 0.02; this is analogous to Table 2-
5 with bandwidth of 0.06. The %ATT for conservation tillage is statistically smaller than 
the other five practices across all sixteen model specifications. For the majority of model 
specifications, the group of practice types with the largest %ATT estimates (hayfield 
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establishment, filter strips, and cover crops) are significantly greater than the group of 
practices with moderate %ATT estimates (grid sampling and grass waterways). But the 
difference in %ATT between the practice types in the largest and moderate groups at 
times is no longer statistically significant; not surprisingly this occurs particularly for 
practice types with a smaller number of enrolled farmers and when using the smaller 
bandwidth at 0.02 (Table A-13). That said, the group of practice types with the largest 
%ATT has a mean difference in %ATT that is greater than 15% in all cases when 
compared to the group of practice types with moderate %ATT (Table A-12). 
As mentioned above, the CSP rules specifically allow funding for both new and 
existing practices that could potentially result in lower levels of additionality for this 
program. As a robustness check, I performed bootstrapped simulations to test whether 
the estimation results on %ATT were significantly different between CSP and all other 
programs. Table 2-6 provides the estimation results for each of the following four 
practice types: conservation tillage, grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips. 
Note that cover crops and hayfield establishment are not included in Table 2-6 because 
the number of farmers enrolled in CSP for these practices was insufficiently large to 
perform this test (see Table 2-2). Estimation results in Table 2-6 indicate that the mean 
%ATT is actually higher in CSP than in all other programs for each of the four practice 
types; however, in all cases the difference was not statistically significant using the 
bootstrapped differences. 
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TABLE 2-6. Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals for the Difference in %ATT 
between CSP and All Other Programs using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel 
Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.06). 
  
      
Practice Type 
% ATT (CSP 
Only) 
% ATT 
(Other 
Programs) 
Difference in 
%ATT 
Std. 
Error 
95% Bootstrapped 
CI 
Conservation Tillage 29.91 18.33 11.58 6.96 -0.93 26.73 
Grid Sampling 70.10 66.18 3.92 8.34 -12.43 20.62 
Grass Waterways 65.88 65.20 0.68 16.41 -37.26 21.89 
Filter Strips 91.66 88.11 3.55 9.20 -15.79 16.96 
 
 
It should be acknowledged that estimation of the ATT using propensity score 
matching is based on the unconfoundedness assumption. If there exist unobserved 
covariates that influence both enrollment and the outcome variables, then the estimated 
ATT may be biased. Although the unconfoundedness assumption cannot be verified in 
practice, Rosenbaum (2002) developed a method to test the extent to which a matching 
estimator is sensitive to hidden bias. Specifically, Rosenbaum‘s approach assumes that 
the propensity score,  1|P D X , is influenced not only by observed covariates X, but 
also by an unobserved covariate. As a result of this unobserved covariate, farmers that 
are matched based on similar propensity score values, may actually differ in their odds 
of enrolling by a factor of  , where 1   represents the baseline case of no hidden 
bias. The higher the level of   to which the ATT remains statistically different from 
zero, the more robust are the estimation results to the potential influence of hidden bias. 
Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis is conducted to estimate the extent to 
which selection on unobservables may bias the estimates of the ATT (see Rosenbaum 
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2002 and DiPrete and Gangl 2004 for more information). Using this approach, which 
relies on a signed rank test, I determine the upper bounds on the significance level (i.e., 
critical p-values) of the ATT for different levels of hidden bias in terms of  . 
Estimation results from the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis are provided in Table 
2-7. The first column provides the   values and the second column (sig+) provides the 
corresponding upper bound on the p-value for the ATT. The critical p-values associated 
with the largest   where the ATT remains statistically significant at the 5% level are 
enclosed in a box. Filter strips is the most robust to the potential presence of hidden bias, 
where the estimated ATT remains statistically different from zero at the 5% level for a 
critical threshold   value at 7.3. Conservation tillage, on the other hand, is the least 
robust to hidden bias, where the critical    value is 1.3. The other practice types have 
moderate to high critical   values ranging from 2.2 for hayfield establishment to 6 for 
cover crops. 
In summary, the estimates for ATT and %ATT are robust across the majority of 
matching model specifications estimated. In addition, for the majority of model 
specifications, the pairwise difference in %ATT between practice types reveal that the 
group of practice types with the largest %ATT estimates (hayfield establishment, filter 
strips, and cover crops) are significantly greater than the group of practices with 
moderate %ATT estimates (grid sampling and grass waterways), while the %ATT for 
conservation tillage is consistently smaller than that of all other practices. Finally, the 
Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis suggests that the ATT estimates vary by practice 
type in their level of robustness to unobserved selection bias. 
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TABLE 2-7. Results for Rosenbaum Bounds Sensitivity Analysis. 
                
Conservation Tillage Cover Crops Hayfield Establishment Grid Sampling 
 
Sig +   Sig +   Sig + 
 
Sig + 
1 0.0043 3 0.0073 1 0.0014 2 0.0002 
1.05 0.0072 3.5 0.0120 1.2 0.0040 2.5 0.0012 
1.1 0.0114 4 0.0176 1.4 0.0083 3 0.0042 
1.15 0.0173 4.5 0.0237 1.6 0.0145 3.5 0.0101 
1.2 0.0252 5 0.0302 1.8 0.0226 4 0.0198 
1.25 0.0353 5.5 0.0369 2 0.0323 4.5 0.0335 
1.3 0.0478 6 0.0437 2.2 0.0435 4.8 0.0435 
1.35 0.0629 6.5 0.0506 2.4 0.0558 5 0.0509 
 
        
Grass Waterways Filter Strips 
 
Sig + 
 
Sig + 
1.4 0.0000 2 0.0000 
1.6 0.0001 3 0.0001 
1.8 0.0007 4 0.0012 
2 0.0033 5 0.0060 
2.2 0.0110 6 0.0175 
2.4 0.0281 7 0.0374 
2.55 0.0498 7.3 0.0450 
2.6 0.0590 7.6 0.0535 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Federal cost-share funding for the adoption of conservation practices on working lands 
have increased considerably starting in 2002. The efficiency of cost-share programs 
depends in part on the degree to which they provide additional conservation effort. In 
this chapter, I use propensity score matching to estimate the level of additionality from 
enrollment in cost-share programs for six conservation practices. Results indicate that 
the enrollment achieves positive and significant levels of additionality for each of the six 
   
 
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practice types. That being said, the percent additionality varies dramatically between 
practice types. Specifically, the percent additionality is highest for hayfield 
establishment (92.9%), filter strips (89.1%), and cover crops (88.9%), while it is lowest 
for conservation tillage (20.5%). While these results are valuable for program managers 
in evaluating conservation program effectiveness, they provide only part of the analysis 
that is required. For example, it is important to evaluate not only increases in 
conservation effort, but also overall improvements in environmental benefits. Having 
quantifiable information on the actual improvement in environmental benefits per 
practice, coupled with additionality estimates, would provide greater insight into the 
effectiveness of conservation programs. 
The practice of offering payment incentives to landowners to improve 
environmental stewardship is growing in popularity. Emerging markets for ecosystem 
services are being developed that offer payments to landowners to enhance carbon 
sequestration and water quality via the adoption of agricultural conservation practices. 
Additionality is a major concern in such programs because it is an essential element of 
program effectiveness. As the implementation of incentive-based programs increases to 
address environmental concerns, analysis of existing programs is crucial to determine 
how much these programs induce increases in conservation effort. In sum, this study 
helps meet that need by measuring additionality for incentive-based programs. 
While Chapter II provides insights into the additionality of conservation 
programs across a range of conservation practices, this research could be improved in 
the following areas. Future directions of study include better accounting for the potential 
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correlation that exists between enrollment in conservation programs for different 
conservation practices, which can lead to a potential bias of the additionality estimates. 
Second, the estimates of additionality are aggregated across several conservation 
programs. Greater insight into conservation programs would be obtained if additionality 
estimates were generated for individual programs rather than as an aggregation across 
several programs. This analysis will be pursued to the extent that the data permits. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DECOMPOSITION OF ADDITIONALITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The estimation of additionality (ATT) in Chapter II of conservation programs is an 
aggregate measure composed of two effects: the new adoption of conservation practices 
versus the expansion of existing conservation practices. First, conservation is 
implemented by farmers who would have not adopted the practice without the subsidy. 
That is, the subsidy convinces ―new-adopters‖ to use an entirely new practice. Second, 
the conservation program subsidy can also cause farmers who would have adopted the 
practice without the subsidy (―prior-adopters‖) to expand their use of the practice. The 
purpose of this chapter is to decompose these two components of the treatment effect 
and empirically estimate them for federal agricultural conservation programs.  
The disaggregation of the ATT into the relative contributions of prior-adopters 
and new-adopters reveals greater insights into the additionality achieved by cost-share 
programs. First, the disaggregation of the ATT allows for a comparison of the level of 
additionality provided by each type of farmer, and, most importantly, whether one 
farmer type provides greater levels of additionality than the other. Second, the 
disaggregation also reveals the proportion of enrolled farmers that belong to each farmer 
type. Overall, the disaggregation of the ATT allows for a more thorough understanding 
of the additionality achieved by cost-share programs.  
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The decomposition of the ATT uses matching estimators to determine the 
likelihood that enrolled farmers are prior-adopters or new-adopters, as well as to 
estimate the relative contribution for each group to the overall ATT. Two main results 
are obtained from decomposing the ATT. First, I find that the ATT for prior-adopters is 
not significant for all practice types, implying that prior-adopters do not significantly 
expand the proportion of conservation acreage when receiving cost-share funding. 
Second, decomposition estimates also suggest that the differences in %ATT between 
practice types are mainly determined by the fraction of enrolled farmers that are prior-
adopters and new-adopters. Practice types that are estimated to have a large fraction of 
new-adopters, such as filters trips and hayfield establishment, exhibit larger values for 
%ATT. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I derive the decomposition of the 
ATT. Second, I derive the estimators for the expected probabilities that enrolled farmers 
are prior-adopters or new-adopters, followed by the estimators for the ATT of prior-
adopters and new-adopters. Thereafter, I provide the estimation results for the 
decomposition of the ATT and robustness checks. I conclude with policy implications 
for conservation programs. 
 
3.2 Decomposition of the Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
In this section, I derive the decomposition of the ATT and the estimators for each of the 
decomposed components of the ATT. 
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3.2.1. Decomposing the ATT for New-Adopters and Prior-Adopters 
I define two types of farmers based on their potential outcome 0Y  (refer to Chapter II). 
Treated farmers are divided into: 
 New-Adopters are enrolled farmers  1D   who would have not adopted the 
practice without funding  0 0Y  .  
 Prior-Adopters are enrolled farmers  1D   who would have adopted the 
practice even in the absence of cost-share funding  0 0Y  . 
As discussed in Chapter II, the potential outcome 0Y  for enrolled farmers is not observed 
and must be estimated. I define as well the probabilities  0 0 | 1P Y D   and 
 0 0 | 1P Y D  , which are the expected probabilities that the enrolled farmers are 
either new-adopters or prior-adopters, respectively. Given that 0 0Y  , it holds that 
    0 00 | 1 0 | 1 1.P Y D P Y D       [3.1] 
The ATT described in the previous chapter in equation [2.1] can be decomposed 
into two parts to determine the relative amount of the ATT that is attributable to prior-
adopters and new-adopters. Using conditional expectations and probabilities based on 0Y
, the ATT can be decomposed into: 
 
      
      
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 | 1 | 0, 1 | 0, 1
0 | 1 | 0, 1 | 0, 1 .
ATT P Y D E Y Y D E Y Y D
P Y D E Y Y D E Y Y D
        
        
 [3.2] 
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The first line represents the portion of the ATT that corresponds to new-adopters, i.e. 
those for whom 0 0Y  . The term  1 0| 0, 1E Y Y D   is the expected proportion of 
acreage that new-adopters dedicate to the conservation practice when receiving funding. 
Meanwhile,  0 0| 0, 1E Y Y D   is the expected proportion new-adopters dedicate to the 
practice when not receiving funding, which equals zero by definition. The difference of 
these two terms equals the expected additional proportion of acreage that new-adopters 
dedicate to the conservation practice when receiving funding. The second line in [3.2] 
represents the portion of the ATT that corresponds to prior-adopters , i.e. those for whom 
0 0Y  . The difference in the two terms  1 0| 0, 1E Y Y D   and  0 0| 0, 1E Y Y D   is 
equal to the expected additional proportion of acreage that prior-adopters dedicate to the 
conservation practice as a result of receiving funding. The overall ATT in equation [3.2] 
equals the weighted average of these two expected gains in the proportion of 
conservation acreage adopted.  
To simplify notation, I define the respective ATT for enrolled new-adopters and 
prior-adopters as 
 
   
   
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
| 0, 1 | 0, 1 ,
| 0, 1 | 0, 1 .
n
a
ATT E Y Y D E Y Y D
ATT E Y Y D E Y Y D
     
     
 [3.3] 
Similarly, I define the respective expected probabilities that the enrolled farmers are 
new-adopters or prior-adopters as 
 
 
 
0
0
0 | 1 , 
0 | 1 .
n
a
P P Y D
P P Y D
  
  
 [3.4] 
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The decomposed ATT in [3.2] can be rewritten as: 
 .n n a aATT P ATT P ATT     [3.5] 
Below I derive the estimators for each of the decomposed terms in equation [3.5]. 
 
3.2.2. Estimators for the Probabilities of New-Adopters and Prior-Adopters 
In this section, I derive the estimators for nP  and aP  in equation [3.4]. I first define a 
binary variable 0B  to explain how matching estimators are used to derive the estimators 
for these probabilities. Specifically, 0B  equals one if a farmer would adopt a practice 
without funding, and zero otherwise, i.e., 0 1B   if 0 0Y  , and 0 0B   if 0 0Y  . The 
probability that 0Y  is greater than zero, aP , can be expressed in terms of the expectation 
of 0B  
      0 0 00 | 1 1| 1 | 1 .aP P Y D P B D E B D         [3.6] 
An estimator for  0 | 1E B D   can be obtained using a matching estimator, analogous to 
the approach used on the estimator for  0 | 1E Y D   in equation [2.2]. This yields the 
estimate for aP , and the estimate for the other probability, nP , can be obtained using 
[3.1]. 
Similar to equation [2.2], the matching estimator for 0
ˆ iB  is the weighted average 
  
0
0 0
ˆ , ,i j
j H
B W i j B

   [3.7] 
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where 0
jB
 
is the 0B  for non-enrollee j. Note that 0
ˆ iB  is the estimate of the probability that 
an enrolled farmer with propensity score iP  is a prior-adopter, such that 
  0 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ| , 1 0 | , 1 .i i ii i i iB E B P D P Y P D        [3.8] 
The matching estimator for  0 | 1E B D   is then the average of the 0ˆ
iB  for the set of I 
enrollees in H1 
  
1
0 0
1ˆ ˆ| 1 .i
i H
E B D B
I 
    [3.9] 
Consequently, given equations [3.6] and [3.7], the estimator for aP  is 
    
1 1 0
0 0 0
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ0 | 1 , ,i ja
i H i H j H
P P Y D B W i j B
I I  
        [3.10] 
and the estimator for nP  is obtained by substituting [3.10] into [3.1] 
    
1 1
0 0 0
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 | 1 1 1 .i in
i H i H
P P Y D B B
I I 
         [3.11] 
 
3.2.3. Estimators for the ATT of New-Adopters and Prior-Adopters 
In this section, I provide the estimators of nATT  for new-adopters and aATT  for prior-
adopters that are defined in equation [3.3], respectively. I first provide the estimators for 
the conditional expectations of 1Y , then for the conditional expectations of 0Y , and 
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finally take the difference in these conditional expectations to arrive at the respective 
estimators for nATT  and aATT .  
The estimator for the conditional expectation of 1Y  for new-adopters is 
  
 
 
1
1
0 1
1 0
0
ˆ1
ˆ | 0, 1 .
ˆ1
i i
i H
i
i H
B Y
E Y Y D
B



  



 [3.12] 
This estimator is the average value of 1Y  across all I enrollees weighted by the estimated 
probability that the enrollee is a new-adopter, 0
ˆ1 iB . Likewise, the estimator for the 
conditional expectation of 1Y  for prior-adopters is: 
   1
1
0 1
1 0
0
ˆ
ˆ | 0, 1 ,
ˆ
i i
i H
i
i H
B Y
E Y Y D
B


  


 [3.13] 
which is the estimator for the average value of 1Y  across all I enrollees weighted by the 
estimated probability that the enrollee is a prior-adopter, 0
ˆ iB . 
The estimator for the conditional expectation of 0Y  for new-adopters, 
 0 0| 0, 1E Y Y D   , equals zero by definition, as noted previously. The estimator for the 
conditional expectation of 0Y  for prior-adopters is  
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  
 
 
 
 
1 0
1 0
0
0
0 0
0
0
,
ˆ | 1ˆ | 0, 1 ,
ˆ 0 | 1
,
j
i H j H
j
i H j H
W i j Y
E Y D
E Y Y D
P Y D
W i j B
 
 

   
 
 
 
 [3.14] 
where I have substituted  0ˆ | 1E Y D   in equation [2.4] and  0ˆ 0 | 1P Y D   in equation 
[3.10] into equation [3.14] above.
8
 
After substituting [3.12] into the expression for nATT  found in equation [3.3] and 
noting that  0 0| 0, 1 0E Y Y D    , the estimator for the ATT of new-adopters is 
obtained   
 
 
 
1
1
0 1
0
ˆ1
ˆ .
ˆ1
i i
i H
n
i
i H
B Y
ATT
B







 [3.15] 
Similarly, after substituting [3.13] and [3.14] into the expression for aATT  in equation 
[3.3], the estimator for the ATT of prior-adopters is obtained 
                                                 
8
 Equation [3.14] can be equivalently expressed as  
 
 
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0
,
ˆ | 0, 1
,
j j
i H j H
j
i H j H
W i j B Y
E Y Y D
W i j B
 
 
  
 
 
 . 
Note that 0 0 0
j j jB Y Y  in the numerator of Equation [3.14] because 0 0
jB   when 0 0
jY  , and 0 1
jB   
when 0 0
jY  .   
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 
 
1 01
1 1 0
00 1
0 0
ˆ ,
ˆ .
ˆ ,
ji i
i H j Hi H
a
i j
i H i H j H
W i j YB Y
ATT
B W i j B
 
  
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
  
 [3.16] 
The estimator for the overall ATT in equation [3.5] is 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,n n a aATT P ATT P ATT     [3.17] 
where the proposed estimators for the decomposed parts in equations [3.10], [3.11], 
[3.15], and [3.16] are substituted into equation [3.17] above. In the section below, I 
validate that this yields the same expression as the overall ATT in equation [2.5]. 
 
3.2.4 Validation of the Estimators for the Decomposition of the ATT 
Here I demonstrate that when the proposed estimators for the decomposed parts in 
equations  [3.10], [3.11], [3.15], and [3.16] are substituted into equation [3.5], this yields 
the same expression as the overall ATT shown in equation [2.5]. To begin, I substitute 
the estimators on the four decomposed parts from equations [3.10], [3.11], [3.15], and 
[3.16] into equation [3.5] 
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  
 
 
 
 
1
1
1
1 01
1
1 1 0
0 1
0
0
00 1
0
0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ1
1 ˆ1
ˆ1
ˆ ,
1 ˆ .
ˆ ,
n n a a
i i
i Hi
ii H
i H
ji i
i H j Hi Hi
n
i ji H
i H i H j H
ATT P ATT P ATT
B Y
B
I
B
W i j YB Y
B
I
B W i j B



 

  
   
 
  
    
    
 
   
            
     
       



 

  
 [3.18] 
After using equation [3.10] and cancelling terms, equation [3.18] can be rewritten as 
    
1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ1 , .i i i i j
i H i H i H j H
ATT B Y B Y W i j Y
I I   
  
    
  
     [3.19] 
The first term in brackets in equation [3.19] reduces to the matching estimator for 
 1 | 1E Y D   in [2.3]. Thus, equation [3.19] yields 
    
1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1ˆ , , ,i j i j
i H i H j H i H j H
ATT Y W i j Y Y W i j Y
I I I    
 
    
 
      [3.20] 
which equals the matching estimator for the overall ATT in equation [2.5]. 
 
3.3 Estimation Results 
In this section, I provide the estimation results on the decomposed components of the 
ATT for the six conservation practices. Refer to the data section of Chapter II for 
information on the data used for the estimation. The estimated average probabilities aP  
and nP  for the set of enrolled farmers that are prior-adopters or new-adopters are 
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calculated based on equations [3.10] and [3.11], respectively. Meanwhile, the estimates 
of nATT  for new-adopters and aATT  for prior-adopters are calculated using equations 
[3.15] and [3.16], respectively. Table 3-1 provides the estimates for the decomposed 
components for all practice types, as well as the overall ATT and %ATT values from 
Table 2-4 for reference. The estimates are performed using propensity score kernel 
matching with the Gaussian kernel type, where the common support requirement is 
enforced and the kernel bandwidth is 0.06 (refer to Chapter II for more information on 
the model specification). The standard errors and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were 
generated using the same bootstrap procedure based on 1,000 simulations. 
The components of the decomposed ATT (Table 3-1) show the relative 
contributions of new-adopters and prior-adopters to the overall ATT, which, in turn, 
explains the differences in %ATT between practice types. Table 3-1 highlights that 
aATT  is less than nATT  for all practice types. Interestingly, aATT  is positive but not 
statistically different from zero for all practices. This result indicates that the cost-share 
programs have no significant effect on the conservation of those who would have 
adopted the practice without funding – the additional conservation comes from 
convincing new-adopters to adopt a conservation practice.  
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TABLE 3-1. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and Decomposed Effects for 
New-Adopters and Prior-Adopters using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel 
Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.06). 
  
    Conservation Tillage Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.1600 0.0321 0.0910 0.2166 
% ATT 20.5 3.6 12.3 26.5 
Pn 0.1403 0.0191 0.1027 0.1769 
Pa 0.8597 0.0191 0.8231 0.8973 
ATTn 0.7449 0.0324 0.6823 0.8090 
ATTa 0.0645 0.0317 -0.0036 0.1190 
Matched enrolled farmers = 86, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 476 
Cover Crops Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2327 0.0472 0.1449 0.3273 
% ATT 88.9 5.7 76.5 94.3 
Pn 0.8665 0.0249 0.8060 0.9033 
Pa 0.1335 0.0249 0.0967 0.1940 
ATTn 0.2623 0.0453 0.1849 0.3527 
ATTa 0.0403 0.0797 -0.1297 0.1774 
Matched enrolled farmers = 24, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 581 
Hayfield Establishment Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2274 0.0660 0.0741 0.3435 
% ATT 92.9 5.0 78.3 96.4 
Pn 0.9007 0.0212 0.8454 0.9326 
Pa 0.0993 0.0212 0.0676 0.1560 
ATTn 0.2401 0.0666 0.0933 0.3595 
ATTa 0.1122 0.0875 -0.1192 0.2247 
Matched enrolled farmers = 18, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 575 
Grid Sampling Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.5032 0.0514 0.3780 0.5827 
% ATT 66.3 4.7 54.8 72.9 
Pn 0.6001 4.6890 0.5113 0.6587 
Pa 0.3999 4.6890 0.3413 0.4887 
ATTn 0.7560 0.0415 0.6689 0.8276 
ATTa 0.1237 0.0614 -0.0074 0.2378 
Matched enrolled farmers = 54, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 484 
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TABLE 3-1. Continued. 
          
Grass Waterways Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0120 0.0023 0.0079 0.0165 
% ATT 65.0 6.1 51.3 75.1 
Pn 0.5771 0.0357 0.5098 0.6456 
Pa 0.4229 0.0357 0.3544 0.4902 
ATTn 0.0187 0.0022 0.0146 0.0234 
ATTa 0.0028 0.0029 -0.0027 0.0089 
Matched enrolled farmers = 144, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 380 
Filter Strips Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0101 0.0020 0.0065 0.0141 
% ATT 89.1 5.3 75.8 95.7 
Pn 0.8326 0.0310 0.7656 0.8851 
Pa 0.1674 0.0310 0.1149 0.2344 
ATTn 0.0114 0.0019 0.0079 0.0154 
ATTa 0.0036 0.0036 -0.00420 0.0103 
Matched enrolled farmers = 92, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 451 
 
 
Practices for which a large fraction of enrolled farmers are prior-adopters (i.e., aP  
is large) typically have a lower %ATT. Consider conservation tillage where nATT  is 
0.75, while aATT  is only 0.07. The estimated fraction of enrolled farmers for 
conservation tillage that are prior-adopters, 0.86aP  , is much larger than that of new-
adopters, 0.14nP  . Consequently, the overall ATT is small relative to the total 
proportion of conservation acreage adopted, and thus, the %ATT is relatively low for 
conservation tillage. 
In general, practices where nP  is considerably larger than aP  have higher %ATT 
values. When comparing the two environmentally sensitive practice types, the fraction of 
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enrolled farmers that are new-adopters for filter strips is 0.83nP  , while for grass 
waterways 0.58nP   (Table 3-1). This is the principle reason why the %ATT is larger 
for filters strips (89.1%) than for grass waterways (65.0%). Similarly, when comparing 
the four field practices, cover crops and hayfield establishment have larger nP  values 
than either grid sampling or conservation tillage. As such, the %ATT values for cover 
crops (88.9%) and hayfield establishment (92.9%) exceed that of either grid sampling 
(66.3%) or conservation tillage (20.5%).  
The heterogeneity in aP  and nP , and consequently in %ATT, may be related to 
differences in the onsite net benefits provided by the different practice types. Higher 
onsite net benefits should increase the likelihood that a farmer would adopt a practice 
even without funding, increasing the proportion of prior-adopters for this practice type. 
Consider a comparison of the two environmentally sensitive practice types. Filter strips 
are typically located along stream banks, and therefore mainly provide offsite benefits in 
terms of improved water quality by reducing nutrients and sediments from entering 
downstream water bodies. Grass waterways, in contrast, are typically installed in natural 
drainage areas within cultivated lands which provide both onsite and offsite benefits. 
The results in Table 3-1, showing that nP  
and
 
 %ATT are higher for filter strips than 
grass waterways, coincide with the expectation that farmers would be less likely to adopt 
filter strips without cost-share funding. 
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3.4 Robustness Checks 
As in Chapter II, I estimate the decomposed effects using a variety of matching 
estimators as a robustness check to the estimation results presented in Table 3-1. Refer to 
the robustness checks section of Chapter II for more information on the sixteen different 
model specifications used.  
The main results in Table 3-1 are generally robust across all the model 
specifications. First, aATT  is less than nATT  for all practice types. In addition, the aATT  
is not statistically different from zero for all practices, except for four model 
specifications, where the aATT  for conservation tillage and grid sampling are 
statistically significant. Second, as discussed in Chapter II, the %ATT for each practice 
across all model specifications are similar in magnitude, and maintain the same ordering 
for the three groups of practices. Given that the %ATT is a function of the decomposed 
components nP , nATT , aP , and aATT  (refer to equations [2.6] and [3.5] ), this implies 
that the decomposed components are also generally similar in magnitude across the 
different model specifications.  
As an example, the estimation results for propensity score kernel matching with 
the Gaussian kernel function and a bandwidth of 0.02 are provided in Table 3-2; this is 
analogous to Table 3-1, except the smaller bandwidth of 0.02 is used instead of 0.06.  
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TABLE 3-2. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and Decomposed Effects for 
New-Adopters and Prior-Adopters using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel 
Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.02). 
  
    Conservation Tillage Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.1351 0.0338 0.0693 0.2019 
% ATT 17.3 3.9 9.5 24.9 
Pn 0.1199 0.0211 0.0863 0.1683 
Pa 0.8801 0.0211 0.8317 0.9137 
ATTn 0.7401 0.0371 0.6661 0.8146 
ATTa 0.0527 0.0333 -0.0169 0.1168 
Matched enrolled farmers = 86, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 476 
Cover Crops Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2220 0.0500 0.1364 0.3216 
% ATT 84.8 9.1 66.1 95.5 
Pn 0.8538 0.0428 0.7465 0.9216 
Pa 0.1462 0.0428 0.0784 0.2535 
ATTn 0.2612 0.0455 0.1836 0.3542 
ATTa -0.0067 0.1032 -0.2218 0.2011 
Matched enrolled farmers = 24, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 581 
Hayfield Establishment Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2232 0.0677 0.0690 0.3398 
% ATT 91.1 9.8 62.6 96.4 
Pn 0.8928 0.0412 0.7778 0.9400 
Pa 0.1072 0.0412 0.0601 0.2246 
ATTn 0.2423 0.0682 0.0872 0.3668 
ATTa 0.0639 0.1152 -0.2071 0.2612 
Matched enrolled farmers = 18, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 575 
Grid Sampling Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.5067 0.0580 0.3503 0.5788 
% ATT 66.7 5.9 50.3 73.4 
Pn 0.5751 0.0502 0.4618 0.6618 
Pa 0.4249 0.0502 0.3382 0.5382 
ATTn 0.7611 0.0438 0.6652 0.8315 
ATTa 0.1623 0.0737 -0.0323 0.2584 
Matched enrolled farmers = 54, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 484 
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TABLE 3-2. Continued. 
          
Grass Waterways Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0121 0.0023 0.0078 0.0165 
% ATT 65.5 6.7 49.8 76.0 
Pn 0.5613 0.0418 0.4843 0.6432 
Pa 0.4387 0.0418 0.3568 0.5157 
ATTn 0.0190 0.0023 0.0147 0.0237 
ATTa 0.0032 0.0031 -0.0030 0.0093 
Matched enrolled farmers = 144, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 380 
Filter Strips Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0101 0.0020 0.0064 0.0141 
% ATT 89.6 5.7 74.7 95.9 
Pn 0.8304 0.0374 0.7431 0.8899 
Pa 0.1696 0.0374 0.1101 0.2569 
ATTn 0.0115 0.0019 0.0078 0.0154 
ATTa 0.0035 0.0040 -0.00459 0.0116 
Matched enrolled farmers = 92, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 451 
 
 
The decomposed estimates found in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 are similar, except for 
differences in the aATT  estimates for cover crops and hayfields. The aATT  for cover 
crops and hayfields in Table 3-1 are 0.0403 and 0.1122, respectively, while they are -
0.0067 and 0.0639, respectively, in Table 3-2. However, none of these estimates are 
statistically significant. Note also that both cover crops and hayfields are the practices 
with the smallest number of enrollees; as such, these practices should experience greater 
variation in the estimates across the different model specifications. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
As stated in Chapter II, the efficiency of cost-share programs depends in part on the 
degree to which they provide additionality. The estimation of additionality (ATT) in 
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Chapter II is based on an aggregate measure of the additionality achieved by cost-share 
programs across two types of farmers: prior-adopters and new-adopters. Decomposing 
the ATT reveals the relative contributions of prior-adopters and new-adopters to the 
overall ATT, thus providing additional insights into the additionality of these programs. 
In this chapter, I develop the decomposition of the ATT, derive estimators for each 
component of the decomposition, and estimate the decomposed terms for all six 
conservation practices. The decomposed estimates enhance the insights obtained from 
the overall ATT estimates found in Chapter II. 
Results indicate that the ATT for prior-adopters ( aATT ) was not significant for 
all practice types, suggesting that program enrollment is not inducing significant 
management changes for farmers who would have used a practice even in the absence of 
cost-share funding. Second, decomposition estimates suggest that the differences in 
%ATT between practice types are mainly determined by the fraction of enrolled farmers 
that are prior-adopters versus new-adopters. Practice types that have a large fraction of 
new-adopters, such as filter strips and hayfield establishment, exhibit larger values for 
%ATT.  
Measuring additionality is of importance not only for conservation programs, but 
for any program or policy where the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is of 
interest. This chapter provides a new methodology that permits the ATT to be 
decomposed into two effects based on the relative contributions of two types of farmers: 
prior-adopters and new-adopters. However, this approach is applicable not only to cost-
share programs, but to the study of any policy or program where participants can be 
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categorized into two distinct groups. As such, the methodology proposed in this chapter 
can be used to decompose the ATT estimates for any program or policy, thus enhancing 
the study of additionality within other programs of interest. 
The analysis of additionality in Chapters II and III is limited in the following 
areas. First, the overall objective of conservation programs is to increase the amount of 
environmental benefits provided by farmers. Consequently, additionality should be 
measured ideally in terms of increases in environmental benefits, rather than increases in 
the percent of conservation acreage. Having quantifiable information on the actual 
improvement in environmental benefits achieved by enrolled farmers would thus provide 
greater insight into the effectiveness of conservation programs. Second, the limited 
information obtained from the survey on the cost-share payments made to farmers per 
practice limit the estimation of additionality to only increases in conservation effort. 
However, the estimation of additionality achieved per dollar spent would provide a more 
interesting analysis of the cost-effectiveness of programs and conservation practices. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF INSTREAM FLOW POLICIES ON AGRICULTURAL WATER 
SECURITY AND STREAMFLOWS* 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Water use conflicts have become a dominant global environmental issue, particularly in 
arid climates, where increasing water demands by growing populations, irrigation for 
agricultural, and the adverse effects of climate change threaten human water security. At 
the same time, a growing awareness of the importance of streamflows for sustaining 
aquatic ecosystems is forcing regulatory agencies to further restrict water uses. Such 
instream flow protections are concerned not only with the quantity of water, but also the 
timing of flow releases and water quality.  
The challenge of reconciling competing water needs is exemplified in the 
Western U.S., where flow regime alterations from water management have been a 
primary driver of ecosystem degradation (Dole and Niemi 2004). Consequently, the 
protection of instream flows has become a necessity for maintaining ecosystem functions 
and preserving endangered species. For example, dam operations in many  
rivers have been modified to meet instream flow requirements for endangered species 
(Richter and Thomas 2007). An increasing recognition of the importance of flow 
____________ 
*Part of this chapter (portions of pages 50, 62-68 and 72) is reprinted with permission 
from ―Agricultural Water Security and Instream Flows for Endangered Species‖ by D.A. 
Newburn, N. Brozovic, and M. Mezzatesta, 2011. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 93 (4),1212-1228, Copyright 2011 by the Oxford University Press. 
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dynamics to aquatic ecosystems (Poff et al. 1997; Bunn and Arthington 2002; Nilsson et 
al. 2005; Dudgeon et al. 2006) has stimulated the development of methods to set 
environmental flow standards, and new approaches for modeling hydro-ecological 
responses to flow alterations (Richter et al. 1997; King and Brown 2006; Poff et al. 
2010; Carlisle et al. 2010).  However, the complex nature of water systems, which 
involve the interaction between economic agents, ecosystem processes, and potential 
regulatory restrictions, has hindered the development of effective water management 
policies. In order to address these difficulties, researchers have emphasized the need for 
multi-disciplinary collaboration (Nilsson et al. 2003) and proposed holistic management 
frameworks for assisting in the development of sustainable water policies (Richter et al. 
2003; Richter 2010; Arthington et al. 2010).  
While the need to protect flows for aquatic ecosystem preservation is now well 
established, the consequences of environmental standards on human water security also 
require consideration. Restrictions on water resources to maintain instream flows have 
the potential to adversely affect agricultural water security (Woodward and Romm 
2001). Several studies have analyzed the economic impacts of meeting instream flow 
requirements and developed least-cost strategies to mitigate these costs (e.g., Paulsen 
and Wernstedt 1995; Turner and Perry 1997; Willis and Whittlesley 1998; Green and 
O‘Connor 2001; Ward and Booker 2003; Briand et al. 2008). These studies have 
generally focused on relatively large rivers in the West, where large dams provide the 
primary source of water for both agricultural water security and augmented instream 
flows. However, many agricultural producers located in upland watersheds have no 
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access to releases from large centrally operated dams, often relying instead on stored 
groundwater or small privately owned onsite reservoirs (i.e., a decentralized water 
management system) (Deitch et al. 2009a; Grantham et al. 2010; Newburn et al. 2011). 
Other economic studies have integrated spatially-explicit environmental models with 
economic models to evaluate the effectiveness of fund allocation strategies focused on 
improving water quality conditions for endangered fish. Wu et al. (2000) and Watanabe 
et al. (2006) show that the cost-effectiveness of targeting strategies for riparian 
restoration depend on the response of ecosystems to restoration efforts, which are 
influenced by nonlinear, ecological cumulative and threshold effects.  
The consequences of instream flow protections on agricultural systems have 
rarely been assessed within watersheds where the method of water delivery is based on a 
decentralized water management regime. Although the environmental impact of a single 
water diversion is typically small, distributed networks of small-scale projects have the 
potential to cumulatively impair flow regimes and adversely affect aquatic species 
(McKay and King 2006; Spina et al. 2006; Deitch et al. 2009b). However, the 
heterogeneous distribution of water diversions across the stream network, and the 
potential for cumulative impacts, make the evaluation of hydrologic impacts particularly 
complicated. Similarly, the effects of flow regulations on water users are likely to vary 
across the landscape. Hence, to analyze the environmental and economic effects of flow 
regulations, a spatially-explicit approach is needed with sufficient spatial and temporal 
resolution to characterize seasonal, free-flowing streams and rivers, and the ability to 
model the impact on small storage ponds for agricultural use. 
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The goal of this chapter is to analyze the effect of recently adopted instream flow 
policies aimed at maintaining bypass-flows for adult salmonid migration within coastal 
California watersheds. As a result of the ESA-listing of salmon, California‘s State Water 
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) has become increasingly stringent in approving new 
appropriative water storage rights (Merenlender et al. 2008; Deitch et al. 2009b), and has 
established new rules that limit diversions by water users to instances when minimum 
streamflow thresholds are met. Diversion guidelines were first introduced in 2002, which 
required that flows exceed the February-media-flow threshold (CDFG/NMFS 2002), and 
subsequently revised in 2010, requiring that flows exceed a minimum-bypass-flow 
threshold necessary for maintaining sufficient water depths for adult salmon migration 
(SWRCB 2010). The recently adopted 2010 policy also provides a decision framework 
for the SWRCB to begin to approve new appropriative water storage rights, which may 
lead to the development of additional onsite storage than currently exists. I explore the 
effects on instream flows and agricultural water security of these recent diversion 
guidelines and of a prior low regulatory policy. Specifically, I quantify the tradeoffs 
between losses in ecologically-relevant flow metrics and impacts on agricultural water 
security for each policy, accounting for spatial and temporal variation in water 
availability. 
In order to evaluate the effects of instream flow policies on streamflows and 
agricultural water security, as well as the prospect of new reservoir construction, 
spatially-explicit economic and hydrologic models are integrated. An economic model is 
developed to predict the location and amount of new onsite water storage. These new 
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reservoirs are included in the landscape in addition to pre-existing reservoirs, which 
allows us to explore the potential impact of new reservoir development on instream 
flows and existing water right permit holders. A hydrologic model, developed in a 
Geographic Information System (GIS), is used to model the impacts on instream flows 
and agricultural water security. This model, which functions at ecologically relevant 
spatial (10 meters) and temporal (daily) scales, is able to estimate unimpaired 
streamflows, propagate the impact of diversions on flows throughout the drainage 
network, reproduce the various instream flow policies, verify whether streamflows 
exceed specific thresholds, calculate the amount of water stored within onsite reservoirs, 
and account for different rainfall years. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study that evaluates the effect of instream flow 
policies on both salmon minimum-bypass-flows and agricultural water security within a 
decentralized management regime. Previous studies have focused on large river systems 
that rely on centrally operated dams to maintain instream flows; however, many 
agricultural producers in upland watersheds have no access to water releases from dams. 
Streams located in the upper parts of watersheds provide pathways for salmon migration 
and rearing habitat for juvenile salmon; as such, protecting instream flows in these areas 
is important. While some studies have explored the effect of diversions on small, free-
flowing streams (Merenlender et al. 2008; Deitch et al. 2009a; Deitch et al. 2009b; 
Grantham et al. 2010), they focus primarily on reductions in streamflow rather than on 
the impact of diversions on meeting minimum-bypass-flow thresholds. This study 
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provides greater insight into the effect of alternative instream flow policies on both 
bypass-flows and water security within a decentralized management regime. 
 
4.2 Background 
Coastal counties of California, such as Napa, Sonoma, and Mendocino counties, have 
experienced a large increase in their acreage of wine grape production since 1990 
(Merenlender 2000). Due to the large increase in newly planted vineyards, 
approximately 50% of all water rights requests throughout all of California from 2000 to 
2006 are located in watersheds within the north coast wine country. Federal listing under 
the ESA of coho salmon in 1995 and steelhead trout in 1997 heightened attention on the 
California State Water Resource Control Board (SWRCB) permitting process within 
these coastal counties. The study area is focused within the Maacama watershed (~180 
km
2
), located within Sonoma County, California. Sonama County is composed of 
Sonoma Valley and part of the Russian River basin (∼2,000 km2). The Maacama 
watershed is representative of the coastal California regions with recent vineyard 
expansion and increased regulatory stringency (Figure 4-1). 
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FIGURE 4-1. Map of the Maacama watershed, including the network of streams, 
vineyards, and points-of-diversion (PODs). 
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The Maacama watershed is characterized by a Mediterranean-like climate, with 
the majority of rainfall occurring in the winter months (November-March), followed by 
a dry period that can last six months and coincides with the grape growing season (April-
September). Precipitation is also quite unpredictable, both seasonally and inter-annually, 
which results in a variable supply of surface water. The upland streams in coastal 
California watersheds experience a high degree of seasonal variation, in which winter 
peak flows may be several orders of magnitude greater than base flows during the 
summer drought period. This causes upland streamflows to peak during the winter 
months, and then slowly recede through the spring as they reach intermittency by the end 
of the dry summer. 
Water users in the Maacama watershed consist mainly of spatially distributed 
agricultural producers. Most of the water demand by agriculture is attributed to 
vineyards, which have water demands for irrigation as well as heat and frost protection. 
The network of vineyards has a high abundance and density of water diversions and 
onsite reservoir storage throughout the watershed (Deitch et al. 2009a), as well as 
growing irrigation needs (Merenlender 2000; Merenlender et al. 2008). Ranchlands also 
have demand for onsite storage; however, this is mostly for stock water ponds, which 
have relatively minor amounts of consumptive water use compared to ponds used for 
vineyard water management.  
The Russian River basin supports several salmonids listed under the ESA, which 
utilize the river and its tributaries for spawning and rearing, including streams within the 
Maacama watershed (Grantham et al., forthcoming). The longest stream in the Maacama 
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watershed is Maacama Creek (11.7 km long), which is one of five main tributaries that 
empties into the Russian River. During the winter, vineyards divert flows from streams 
to fill reservoirs, which can potentially impact bypass flows for adult salmon migration. 
At the same time, because low-flow periods coincide with peak agricultural water 
demands, diversions and subsurface groundwater pumping during the summer can 
accelerate stream drying and potentially limit summer rearing habitat for juvenile fish 
(Deitch et al. 2009a). Consequently, in an effort to protect instream flows for endangered 
salmonids, the California SWRCB has denied most landowner requests since 1990 for 
new appropriative water rights to construct water storage ponds (Merenlender et al. 
2008; Deitch et al. 2009b). The State‘s intention is to maintain winter flows to increase 
adult fish migration during the winter months (Merenlender et al. 2008).This has 
resulted in delays in processing new permits and led to a backlog of applications. As a 
consequence, the need for water storage is probably in excess of the current stock of 
water storage sites on the landscape.  
The SWRCB has also imposed increasingly stringent regulations on winter 
diversions to protect adult fish migration. The diversion guidelines require that a certain 
flow threshold be exceeded at the landowner‘s point-of-diversion (POD) (Figure 4-1) 
before water can be extracted from a stream to fill an onsite reservoir. Prior to the 
development of these diversion thresholds, individuals with appropriative water rights 
were effectively unregulated and could capture all streamflow at a POD to fill a 
reservoir. I refer to the absence of a diversion-guideline as the unregulated policy. 
Diversion-guidelines were first implemented in 2002, and were later revised in 2010. 
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Both of these guidelines restrict diversions to take place between Dec 15
th
 to Mar 31
st
 
(referred to as the diversion period or season). The 2002 guidelines (CDFG/NMFS 
2002), referred herein as the moderate policy, allow diversions when streamflows exceed 
the unimpaired February-median-flow (Qfmf) threshold at the POD. Historically, the 
month of February experiences higher flows relative to other months, and thus provides 
a reference for setting flow thresholds for adult salmon migration. The more recent 
North-Coast Instream Flow Policy guidelines (SWRCB 2010), referred to as the strict 
policy, sets a higher diversion threshold than the moderate policy. This threshold is 
determined using a formula developed by the SWRCB, which defines the minimum-
bypass-flow (Qmbf ) necessary for salmon to be able to migrate upstream (SWRCB 
2010), thus allowing them the possibility to reach adequate spawning grounds 
(Merenlender et al. 2008).  
Using data from a gauge within Maacama Creek located in the Maacama 
watershed, a hydrograph for a POD on a headwater stream is provided for a dry rainfall 
year (1981) and a moderate year (1975) covering the migration period (Oct 1
st
 – April 
30
th
) (Figure 4-2).
9
 The hydrograph highlights the variability in flow for a small, upland 
stream within this area. The two flow thresholds (Qmbf  and Qfmf) corresponding to this 
stream segment are provided in the graph. An important ecological metric is the number 
of days throughout the migration period that the minimum-bypass-flow threshold is met, 
such that salmon would be able to migrate upstream through during this period. I refer to 
                                                 
9
 Table 4-4 provides a summary of the data for twenty precipitation years. 
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this ecological metric as the number of ‗bypass-flow days,‘ i.e., the number of days that 
the minimum-bypass-flow threshold (Qmbf) is met at a particular stream segment. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-2. Hydrograph for a dry and moderate rainfall year (1981 and 1975, 
respectively) at a POD located on a headwater stream within the Maacama watershed. 
Included in the hydrograph are the Qfmf (moderate) and Qbmf (strict) diversion 
thresholds, where the diversion season is from Dec 15
th
 – Mar 31st and the migration 
period is from Oct 1st - April 30th. 
 
 
For both rainfall years, streamflow exceeds the Qfmf threshold on more occasions 
than it does the Qmbf threshold (Figure 4-2). Thus, for these two years, more days are 
available for diverting streamflow under the moderate policy than under the strict policy. 
When comparing the dry year (1981) to the moderate year (1975), both the Qfmf and Qmbf 
thresholds are met with greater frequency during the moderate year than during the dry 
year. Note also that for the dry year, the first major peak-flow that exceeds both 
thresholds occurs outside of the diversion period. As such, under both policies, none of 
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this excess flow can be diverted for storage in a reservoir, and must be allowed to 
continue downstream. The unregulated policy, however, essentially imposes a diversion 
threshold of zero, and all available streamflow can be diverted throughout the entire 
migration period. 
 
4.3 Methods 
In this section, I introduce the methodological approach utilized in the analysis. I begin 
with the development of an economic model of landowner decisions for vineyard and 
reservoir development. This model is used to predict where reservoir construction would 
likely take places within the Maacama watershed in the absence of restrictions on water 
right storage permits, i.e., I predict where there exists a need for new onsite storage. 
These new reservoirs are then included in the hydrologic simulation analysis along with 
all existing reservoirs within the Maacma watershed.  
I then proceed to describe the spatially-explicit hydrologic model used in the 
simulation analysis. This model simulates the cumulative impact of diversions on 
streamflows throughout the drainage network, and the diversion restrictions imposed on 
water users under the different instream flow polices. Finally, I define a set of seven 
policy scenarios within the hydrologic model, which are used to evaluate the impacts on 
instream flows and agricultural water security under the different policies and 
precipitation years. 
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4.3.1 Economic Model 
As a result of the ESA listing of salmonids, the SWRCB placed increasing restrictions 
on the approval of appropriative water rights for onsite storage within the Maacama 
watershed and the surrounding northern-California counties. Newburn et al. (2011) 
analyzed the effects of the listing of salmonid species on landowner behavior in Sonoma 
County, and showed that vineyard development with onsite reservoirs became 
significantly less likely after the listing, particularly in upland watersheds with seasonal 
streams.
10
 The recently approved diversion-guidelines, however, provide a framework 
for approving new water storage permits. Since new reservoir development can affect 
the water security of permitted water users and instream flows, it is important to identify 
the need for additional reservoirs throughout the watershed. An economic model is 
employed to predict the development of additional onsite storage by landowners within 
the Maacama watershed under the assumption that restrictions on reservoir construction 
are relaxed. 
The economic model consists of a bivariate probit econometric model which 
characterizes the landowner‘s joint decision on vineyard and reservoir construction in 
the period prior to the ESA listing, during a time of lower regulatory stringency on 
reservoir development. I develop a cross-sectional version of the panel bivariate probit 
model developed in Newburn et al. (2011). The econometric model developed in 
Newburn et al. (2011) is a panel bivariate probit model used to study the effect of the 
                                                 
10
 Refer to Newburn et al. (2011) for a theoretical economic model of the landowner choice between onsite 
surface water storage and groundwater for a recently developed vineyard without access to dam releases. 
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ESA listing on landowner behavior before and after the listing. However, since the focus 
is on modeling reservoir development decisions prior to severe restrictions (i.e., prior to 
the listing), I rely on a cross-sectional model rather than a panel model. 
The econometric model assumes that a landowner makes two discrete choice 
decisions on land use (build vineyard or not) and water management (build reservoir or 
not) for the period prior to the ESA listing. The cross-sectional bivariate probit model 
defines two unobserved latent variables, *1iy   and 
*
2iy , used to represent the underlying 
value of vineyard and reservoir development, respectively, on property i 
 
*
1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 ,
i i i i
i i i i
y x u
y x u


 
 
 [4.1] 
where the parameter vectors are 1  and 2
  and the error terms 1iu  and 2iu  follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit variances, and correlation  . 
Explanatory variables, 1ix  and 2ix , represent the vectors of time-invariant property 
attributes, such as geology type, stream access, slope, microclimate and other physical 
variables, that affect the profitability of vineyard development and reservoir 
construction. All explanatory variables are included in both the vineyard and reservoir 
equations within the bivariate probit model. The bivariate probit model specifies the 
observed outcomes to be 
 
*
1 1 1
*
2 2 2
1 0, 0 ,
1 0, 0 .
i i i
i i i
y if y y otherwise
y if y y otherwise
  
  
 [4.2] 
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The reduced-form model shown in [4.1] is based on a structural model that includes the 
latent variables *
1iy  and 
*
2iy  as right-hand side variables. Intuitively, this structural model 
means that, for a given property, the value of reservoir construction also depends on the 
value of vineyard development, and vice versa. Then, the structural model with 
simultaneity in the latent variables is reformulated as a reduced-form model based on the 
exogenous parcel attributes. 
The econometric model given by [4.1] is used to estimate the probability of 
reservoir construction for vineyard landowners within the Maacama watershed that do 
not have onsite storage. The joint probability function for vineyard and reservoir 
development is 
    1 2 1 1 2 2Pr 1, 1 , , ,i i i iy y x x        [4.3] 
where 1 1iy   and 2 1iy   imply that the landowner develops both vineyard and onsite 
storage, respectively,  is the cumulative density function for the standardized bivariate 
normal distribution  with zero means, unit variances, and correlation  . The probability 
of reservoir construction, conditioned on vineyard development and landowner property 
attributes, is determined using the following conditional probability 
  
 
 
1 2 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 1 2
Pr 1, 1| ,
Pr 1| 1, , ,
Pr 1| ,
i i i i
i i i i
i i i
y y x x
y y x x
y x x
 
  

 [4.4] 
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where 2 1iy   implies that the landowner builds a reservoir, and the probability of 
development is conditioned on the landowner having a vineyard, 1 1iy  , and the 
landowners characteristics 1ix  and 2ix . 
 
Estimation of the Econometric Model 
The landowner property is the basic unit of analysis for the econometric model. The 
Sonoma County Tax Assessor‘s Office provides the complete map of parcel boundaries, 
and the assessor‘s database contains landowner name, current use, and other 
characteristics for each parcel. The landowner data covers a significant portion of 
Sonoma County, composed of Sonoma Valley and part of the Russian River basin. 
Agricultural landowners may own and jointly operate multiple parcels; for example, a 
vineyard is located on the one parcel and a reservoir on another parcel. Parcel boundaries 
are combined to create the landowner ―property‖ where adjacent parcels have the same 
landowner name. Most landowners only have a single parcel for their property. Those 
properties with limited agricultural use are screened out based on the following criteria: 
public lands, cities and municipal sewer service areas, assessor codes for non-
agricultural land uses (e.g., commercial, industrial, residential), and properties less than 
20 acres.  
High-resolution aerial photographs for 1973, 1993, and 2006 are used to map and 
digitize all vineyards and reservoirs in Sonoma Valley and the Russian River basin 
within a geographical information system (GIS). The photographs in 1993 provide a 
view of the landscape for the crucial year immediately prior to the species listing of coho 
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salmon in the study area.
11
 Consequently, all vineyards and reservoirs established during 
the 1973-1993 period occur before restrictions on reservoir construction became more 
severe. The dataset for the 1973-1993 period thus provides landowner development 
decisions prior to the moratorium on reservoir construction. Meanwhile, vineyards and 
reservoirs established during the 1993-2006 period occur largely after severe restrictions 
on reservoir construction were in effect. Combining the vineyard and reservoir GIS 
datasets with the parcel map, for each landowner property the period of establishment 
for vineyards and reservoirs is determined, as well as the amount of vineyard acreage 
and reservoir capacity.
12
 Vineyards built without a reservoir are assumed implicitly to 
rely on groundwater pumping or summer diversions. 
The data used to estimate the econometric model [4.1] consists of all landowner 
reservoir and vineyard construction decisions made in Sonoma County during the period 
from 1973-1993, prior to severe restrictions on reservoir construction. The dataset is 
generated as follows. First, I determine the set of undeveloped properties in 1973, i.e., 
properties that had neither a vineyard nor a reservoir. There are 3,561 properties in 
Sonoma County that were undeveloped in 1973.Then, for this set of undeveloped 
properties, the landowner makes a land use decision (develop vineyard or not) and a 
water management decision (build a reservoir or not) during the period 1973-1993. For 
                                                 
11
 The coho salmon listing occurred in 1995, and the aerial photos in 1993 were the best available high-
resolution imagery data prior to listing within region. According to Sonoma County Agricultural Crop 
Reports, over 94 percent of the vineyard acreage planted in the period 1993-2006 occurred after the coho 
listing in 1995. 
12
 Reservoir capacity is estimated using a previously determined regression function that relates reservoir 
volume to reservoir surface area. The surface area of each digitized reservoir is calculated using a tool 
within GIS. 
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these properties, I provide the frequency of the four possible development decisions 
made by landowners during the time period 1973-1993 (Table 4-1). Of the 3,561 
properties, there were 85 vineyards built with reservoir and 309 vineyards without 
reservoirs. Additionally, there were 180 properties with only reservoirs, which are 
primarily on ranchland for stock watering. There were also 2,987 properties with no 
development of any kind during this period. 
 
TABLE 4-1. Vineyard and Reservoir Development Outcomes during the 1973-1993 
Period. 
        
 
Reservoir No reservoir Total   
Vineyard 85 309 394 
No vineyard 180 2987 3167 
Total 265 3296 3561 
 
 
Explanatory variables in the economic model are site characteristics extracted 
within the GIS for each of the 3,561 landowner properties, such as: geology, riparian 
access, slope, microclimate, and other variables. Some attributes are explanatory 
variables that are expected primarily to affect conversion costs or returns for the 
vineyard development decision. Some variables are expected mainly to affect the 
landowner‘s costs or value of water security from building onsite storage, relative to 
relying only on groundwater or summer diversions. 
The following set of landowner property attributes are used in the economic 
model. Growing degree-days, averaged over the April to October vineyard growing 
 67 
season, serves as a proxy for microclimate.
13
 A warmer microclimate may be expected to 
increase the likelihood for a landowner to build a reservoir to meet higher water demand. 
Average slope (percent) and elevation (meters) are calculated for each property. Because 
steeper slopes raise the vineyard establishment costs and lower grape yields, vineyard 
development is expected to be more likely on areas with lower slope. Reservoirs are also 
more expensive to build in steep areas. Elevation is used to represent the property 
location relative to the valley floor. A dummy variable is used to represent whether a 
given property is situated within the 100-year floodplain. Vineyards and reservoir 
construction are not restricted in floodplain areas, but they are at greater risk for damage. 
The distance in kilometers from each property centroid to the nearest major highway is 
calculated. This variable represents a vineyard landowner‘s access to markets and 
population centers within Sonoma County, because all cities are located along these 
transportation corridors. 
Physical variables that represent the landowner‘s access to adequate ground and 
surface water supplies during the summer growing season (i.e., water supplies other than 
onsite storage) are expected to affect development decisions. Groundwater potential is 
based on the geology type because alluvial areas have much higher groundwater yields 
than areas with other geology types. Dummy variables are created for the four main 
geologic types (in order from highest to lowest expected groundwater yield): young 
alluvium, old alluvium, volcanic, and Franciscan. Young alluvium serves as the baseline 
                                                 
13
 Temperature data were taken from the Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model 
(PRISM), which is created by the Spatial Climate Analysis Service at Oregon State University. Growing 
degree-days were averaged for each two kilometer grid cell in the region over the growing season (April 
1
st
 to September 30
th
). 
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geologic type in the regression model. Because the other three geology types have a 
lower expected groundwater yield, landowners in these water insecure areas are 
expected to be more likely to build an onsite reservoir. 
Riparian access influences the landowner‘s access to surface water supplies. The 
State of California maintains riparian rights for those landowners adjacent to rivers and 
streams. A dummy variable called ―mainstem‖ is created to indicate whether the 
landowner property is adjacent to either the Russian River mainstem or Dry Creek River, 
where two large-scale dams are required to release water to maintain stream flows within 
these rivers. However, the vast majority of landowners are located in smaller upland 
watersheds outside the influence of large-scale dams. Another dummy variable called 
―seasonal stream‖ is used to represent whether a seasonal stream runs through or is 
adjacent to the landowner property. Riparian access to seasonal streams provides an 
opportunity to store water during winter peak flows. Lastly, a third dummy variable 
represents landowners who do not have riparian access to either the mainstem river or 
seasonal stream (serving as the baseline type). Landowners with riparian access to 
seasonal streams are expected to have the highest likelihood of reservoir construction 
because they are water insecure during the summer growing season, but have stream 
access to fill and store water. 
The estimation results for the cross-sectional bivariate probit model [4.1] are 
provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B. Results suggest that growing degree-days and 
access to the mainstream increase the likelihood of vineyard construction, while 
increasing slope decreases the likelihood of construction. With regard to reservoir 
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construction, landowners with access to seasonal streams and lower groundwater yields 
are significantly more likely to build onsite storage, while increasing slope decreases the 
likelihood of construction.  Elevation also increases the likelihood of reservoir 
construction. Refer to Newburn et al. (2011) for a more detailed discussion on the effect 
of the explanatory variables on vineyard and reservoir construction. 
 
Prediction of New Reservoirs 
In this section, I predict the reservoir development that would have potentially occurred 
within the Maacama watershed in the absence of the SWRCB limitations on reservoir 
construction. I then combine the predicted new reservoirs with the set of reservoirs 
existing in the 2006 Maacama landscape to obtain a complete map of reservoirs across 
the watershed. I use the estimated parameters in Table B-1, in Appendix B, and the 
conditional probability formulation given by [4.4] to estimate the probability of reservoir 
development for a subset of properties within the Maacama watershed. The subset of 
properties consists of those landowners who had vineyard and no onsite reservoir by 
2006 (i.e., by the end of the period, 1993-2006, after the ESA listing). Onsite storage 
development by landowners with no vineyard is mostly for stock water ponds, which 
have relatively minor amounts of consumptive water use compared to ponds for 
vineyard water management. Consequently, I focus only on landowners with more than 
one acre of vineyard. Note that the time period after the ESA listing (1993-2006) is 
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shorter than the time period prior to the listing (1973-1993). As such, I adjust the 
conditional probabilities obtained from [4.4] to account for this shorter time span.
14
  
There are 217 properties within the Maacama watershed that are greater than or 
equal to 20 acres in size. Of these, 59 had more than one acre of vineyard and no onsite 
reservoir by 2006. For each of these properties, I generate a single random number and, 
if the number drawn exceeds the estimated conditional probability of reservoir 
development, I predict that a reservoir will be developed on their property.
15
 This 
random simulation represents one realistic expansion of reservoir development across 
the Maacama landscape. Although this represents only one possible development 
scenario, using many reservoir development scenarios was not feasible given the 
computational demands of conducting the simulations within the hydrologic model. 
Nonetheless, several development scenarios were evaluated, and the low concentration 
of new reservoirs across the landscape suggested that the main findings were unlikely to 
be impacted by the specific random development scenario. 
The economic model predicts that, out of the 59 landowners with vineyard and 
no reservoir storage by 2006, 9 landowners would construct a reservoir. This represents 
an increase in reservoirs of approximately 15%. New reservoirs are placed at the point 
within the landowner property with the largest catchment area. The storage capacity for 
                                                 
14
 The conditional probability of reservoir construction for the period 1993-2006 under the assumption of 
no limitations on reservoir construction is given by
    
13
(1/20)
93 06 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2Pr 1| 1, , 1 1 Pr 1| 1, , ,i i i i i i i iy y x x y y x x
       
 
 where 
 2 1 1 2Pr 1| 1, ,i i i iy y x x   is given by [4.4]. 
15
 The conditional probability of reservoir construction is assumed to be independent across landowner 
properties. 
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each new reservoir, in acre-feet, is set equal to two-thirds of the vineyard acreage located 
on the landowner property.
16
  
 
Mapping of Reservoirs 
The storage capacity and the location of the POD for each reservoir, both new 
and existing, within the Maacama watershed must be specified before the hydrologic 
model can predict the impact of diversions across the drainage network. The POD for 
each reservoir in the Maacama watershed is determined as follows: 1) if a stream exists 
on the landowner property, the POD for the reservoir is assumed to be the stream point 
within the property closest to the reservoir
17
; 2) if no stream exists on the property, then 
the POD for the reservoir is assumed to be located at the downstream most point of the 
reservoir. For the simulations conducted, there are a total of 70 PODs within the 
Maacama watershed: 61 are pre-existing, and 9 are predicted by the economic model. 
Table 4-2 provides a summary for new and all (i.e., both new and pre-existing) PODs 
within the Maacama watershed by catchment area and reservoir capacity. The total 
storage capacity for all reservoirs within the Maacama watershed is 1,896 ac-ft. 
For each reservoir, both new and existing, it is necessary to also identify whether 
the reservoir is associated with a permitted or unpermitted diversion. This allows us to 
explore the potential impacts of diversions by unpermitted water users on permitted 
water users. Landowner compliance on reservoir storage for all existing reservoirs 
                                                 
16
 The approximation that grape production requires two-thirds of an acre-foot of water for irrigation per 
acre of vineyard was obtained from Lewis et al. (2008). 
17
 Streams on properties were identified using the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) provided by the 
U.S. Geological Survey. 
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within the Maacama watershed is assessed from the SWRCB water right permit data. 
Permit locations were overlaid with the landowner property map to determine which 
landowners with existing reservoirs in the Maacama watershed have an approved 
appropriative right for onsite storage.
18
 Landowners with existing reservoirs that have an 
approved appropriative right for onsite storage are classified as having permitted 
diversions. Those landowners with existing reservoirs that do not have an approved 
appropriative right are classified as having unpermitted diversions. All reservoirs 
predicted by the economic model are considered as unpermitted diversions as well since 
they have yet to obtain an approved appropriative right for storage. Of the 70 PODs in 
the Maacama watershed, 35 are associated with permitted diversions, and 35 with 
unpermitted diversions, including the 9 reservoirs predicted by the economic model, all 
of which are considered unpermitted diversions (Figure 4-3).  A summary of the 70 
PODs by catchment area and reservoir capacity, broken down by permitted and 
unpermitted diversions, is provided in Table 4-3. 
 
                                                 
18
 Registered riparian rights and appropriative rights for diversion were similarly assessed for each 
landowner; however, these water rights do not allow for storage during the winter rainy season for later 
use during the growing season. 
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TABLE 4-2. Number of New and All PODs by Catchment Area and Reservoir 
Capacity. 
      New Catchment Area (miles squared)     
Reservoir 
Capacity (ac-ft) 
< 1 1-10 >=10 Grand Total 
Total 
Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
<10 3 0 0 3 17.33 
10-50 3 1 1 5 77.33 
>50 0 1 0 1 88.00 
Grand Total 6 2 1 9 182.66 
Total Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
60.00 103.33 19.33 182.66   
All Catchment Area (miles squared)     
Reservoir 
Capacity (ac-ft) 
< 1 1-10 >=10 Grand Total 
Total 
Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
<10 28 4 3 35 189.49 
10-50 17 4 3 24 591.64 
>50 8 2 1 11 1114.45 
Grand Total 53 10 7 70 1895.58 
Total Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
1441.80 328.34 125.44 1895.58 
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FIGURE 4-3. Map of permitted and unpermitted diversions in the Maacama watershed. 
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TABLE 4-3. Number of PODs (Both Permitted and Unpermitted) by Catchment Area 
and Reservoir Capacity. 
      Permitted Catchment Area (miles squared)     
Reservoir 
Capacity (ac-ft) 
< 1 1-10 >=10 Grand Total 
Total Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
<10 14 2 1 17 75.31 
10-50 6 3 0 9 244.59 
>50 7 1 1 9 931.54 
Grand Total 27 6 2 35 1251.44 
Total Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
974.95 213.92 62.57 1251.44   
Unpermitted Catchment Area (miles squared)     
Reservoir 
Capacity (ac-ft) 
< 1 1-10 >=10 Grand Total 
Total Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
<10 14 2 2 18 114.18 
10-50 11 1 3 15 347.05 
>50 1 1 0 2 182.91 
Grand Total 26 4 5 35 644.14 
Total Capacity 
(ac-ft) 
466.85 114.42 62.87 644.14 
  
 
 
4.3.2 Hydrologic Model 
The hydrologic model is a spatially-explicit watershed model that allows for the analysis 
of cumulative impacts on streamflows at ecologically relevant scales resulting from 
diversions by a distributed network of water users (Merenlender et al. 2008; Grantham et 
al., 2010). Specifically, it is designed to propagate streamflow impacts at a daily time 
scale downstream through the drainage network associated with diversions used to fill 
onsite reservoirs. The model is capable of running under various precipitation years, 
estimating streamflow impairments, determining whether daily expected streamflows 
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meet specific flow thresholds, calculating the amount of water stored within reservoirs, 
and imposing different regulations on diversions.  
  In order to model stream discharge at all points throughout the drainage network, 
inputs to the hydrologic model consist of a 10-meter digital elevation model (DEM) for 
the Maacama watershed, which is used to construct the drainage network of streams 
within the watershed. Daily streamflow within the drainage network is estimated using 
twenty years of gauge data (1961-1980) from a historical USGS gauge on Maacama 
Creek. These data are scaled by catchment area and precipitation ratios in order to 
estimate flows within all streams segments in the drainage network for the twenty 
precipitation years. The twenty years of USGS gauge data for Maacama Creek are 
ranked based on the total recorded annual flow (Table 4-4).  
An end of anadromy (EOA) GIS layer is used by the hydrologic model to 
establish the location on a stream considered physically inaccessible to adult salmon 
migration, even under unimpaired conditions. More specifically, the SWRCB defines an 
EOA point as a point on a stream segement where there exists a gradient that is of a 
continuous longitudinal slope of 12%, or greater, over a distance of 330 feet (SWRCB 
2010). Because salmon cannot migrate to places above EOA points, the number of days 
that the salmon minimum-bypass-flow threshold (Qmbf) is met on a stream (i.e., the 
number of bypass-flow days) is only ecologically relevant for streams segments located 
below the EOA. The hydrologic model thus segregates stream segments that are above 
and below the EOA. 
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TABLE 4-4. Precipitation Years (1961-1981) used for Hydrologic Simulations for 
Maacama Creek Ranked by Total Annual Flow. 
        
Rank Year  Rank Annual Flow (ac-ft) 
Driest 1977 1 1,642  
 
1976 2 8,548  
 
1972 3 18,151  
 
1964 4 23,485  
Dry 1981 5 34,783  
 
1979 6 38,220  
 
1968 7 41,694  
 
1962 8 47,795  
 
1966 9 50,365  
Moderate 1975 10 50,365  
 
1971 11 60,102  
 
1980 12 70,898  
 
1973 13 73,000  
 
1963 14 74,563  
Wet 1965 15 84,936  
 
1967 16 90,953  
 
1978 17 95,050  
 
1969 18 95,861  
 
1970 19 97,990  
Wettest 1974 20 121,131  
Mean 
  
58,977  
Std. Dev.     32,984  
 
 
The hydrologic model calculates the bypass-flow threshold, Qmbf, for every 
stream segment and POD in the drainage network as follows (SWRCB 2010): 
i. If the catchment area upstream of the stream segment, or POD, is 1 square mile 
or smaller, then the bypass-flow threshold is given by 
 9.0 .mbf mQ Q  [4.5] 
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ii. If the catchment area upstream of the stream segment, or POD, is greater than 1 
square mile, then the bypass-flow threshold is given by 
  
0.47
8.8 ,mbf mQ Q DA

  [4.6] 
where Qmbf equals the minimum-bypass-flow in cubic-feet-per-second needed for salmon 
bypass, Qm equals the mean annual unimpaired flow in cubic-feet-per-second, and DA 
equals the watershed drainage area, or catchment area, in square miles upstream of the 
stream segment or POD. The hydrologic model compares the estimated mean daily flow 
at a stream segment or POD to the corresponding bypass-flow threshold to determine 
whether the bypass-flow threshold is met. 
The modeling of diversion guidelines by the hydrologic model requires that the 
following be defined for each reservoir: its storage capacity, the location of its POD, and 
whether the diversion is permitted or unpermitted. With all of the above specified, it is 
then possible to impose any of the three diversion policies (unregulated, moderate, and 
strict) at each POD. For the unregulated policy, all water users are not subject to 
diversion thresholds, and can capture all streamflow at a POD during any day throughout 
the migration period, from Oct 1
st
 to April 30
th
. Once a reservoir reaches its capacity, all 
flow at the POD is assumed to continue downstream, and no further diversions are 
simulated. 
Under the moderate policy, I assume that flows must exceed the February-
median-flow (Qfmf) threshold at the POD before diversions are allowed. The hydrologic 
model calculates the Qfmf for every stream at each POD using the daily February flows 
for twenty years of data from the historical USGS gauge on Maacama Creek (Table 4-4), 
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which are scaled accordingly based on catchment area. Under this policy, diversions are 
only on days within the diversion period, from Dec 15
th
 to Mar 31
st
.  
For the strict policy, the model distinguishes between PODs located below and 
above the EOA. If a POD is located above an EOA point, then diversions are allowed if 
streamflow exceeds the February-median-flow threshold (i.e., the same threshold as 
under the moderate policy). However, if a POD is located below an EOA point, then 
flow must exceed the bypass-flow threshold (Qmbf) at the POD. The bypass-flow 
threshold is larger than the February-median-flow threshold, and thus allows for less 
water extraction, and generally for fewer diversion days, than the moderate policy 
(Figure 4-2). The strict policy also caps the cumulative storage capacity of PODs above 
EOA at ten-percent of the seasonal flow volume at the EOA. As with the moderate 
policy, diversions under the strict policy are limited to be within the diversion period. 
 
4.3.3 Policy Scenarios 
The hydrologic model is used to study the impact of diversions, instream flow policies, 
and precipitation years on instream flows and agricultural water security. I define a set of 
seven policy scenarios within the hydrologic model, which allow for a comparison of 
impacts on instream flows and agricultural water security across different policies and 
precipitation years. The seven policy scenarios are defined in Table 4-5. 
 
 
 
 80 
TABLE 4-5. Scenario Numbers and Descriptions of Policy Scenarios for Permitted and 
Unpermitted Diversions. 
   Policy for Permitted Diversions 
 
 
none  
allowed 
strict moderate unregulated 
Policy for 
Unpermitted 
Diversions 
none allowed 1 2 3 4 
strict   5     
moderate     6   
unregulated       7 
 
 
Scenario 1 is the baseline scenario, where streamflows are unimpaired by 
diversions (i.e., no diversions are allowed). Scenarios 2-4 impose the strict, moderate, 
and unregulated policies, respectively, on permitted diversions only (i.e., no diversions 
by unpermitted water users are allowed). Scenarios 5-7 impose the strict, moderate, and 
unregulated policies, respectively, on both permitted and unpermitted diversions. All 
seven scenarios in Table 4-5 are run in the hydrologic model for each of the twenty 
precipitation years, resulting in twenty simulations per policy scenario and a total of 140 
simulations. 
As a result of diversions throughout the drainage network, total water flow 
through stream segments that are downstream of PODs, or that contain a POD, will be 
potentially reduced. To measure and compare the impact of diversions on instream flows 
across the different policy scenarios, two ecological metrics are used. The first metric is 
the number of days that the salmon bypass-flow threshold (Qmbf) is met at each stream 
segment (i.e., the number of bypass-flow days). The hydrologic model compares the 
estimated mean daily flow predicted for each stream segment under a policy scenario to 
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the corresponding bypass-flow threshold, and counts the number of days that the 
threshold is met at each stream segment throughout the migration period. The 
unimpaired scenario (scenario 1) provides the number of bypass-flow days for every 
stream segment in the absence of diversions. Thus, the impacts of diversions under each 
policy scenario can be measured by the observed losses of bypass-flow days relative to 
the unimpaired scenario. 
The second ecological metric I define for every stream segment in the drainage 
network is the percent loss in streamflow, or equivalently, the percent of flow that is 
diverted from a stream segment. For each policy scenario, the percent loss in streamflow 
for a stream segment equals the percent reduction in the total amount of flow relative to 
the unimpaired scenario. The reduction is measured relative to the total amount of flow 
throughout the migration period. 
I also measure the water security of a landowner based on the percent of the 
reservoir capacity that is filled by diversions at the end of the high flow season on April 
30
th
. This metric serves as a proxy for water security and allows us to compare these 
values across different landowners. 
 
4.4 Results 
In this section, I present the results of the simulation analysis. The overall focus of the 
analysis is to understand the relative influence of instream policies on bypass-flows and 
agricultural water security within a decentralized water management regime. I begin by 
analyzing the natural spatial and temporal variation in the number of bypass-flow days in 
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the absence of diversions. I then explore the impact of agricultural diversions on 
streamflows by measuring the losses in bypass-flow days under the various diversion 
guidelines. This allows us to evaluate how much each policy reduces the impact of 
diversions on bypass-flow days. I evaluate these impacts both spatially and temporally to 
understand the heterogeneity of diversion impacts on streams. The effect of diversions 
on flow is also measured in terms of the percent reduction in streamflow, which provides 
additional information on the impact of diversions, and regulations, on instream flows.   
Afterwards, I turn my attention to agricultural water security. I evaluate the 
agricultural water security of water users, both spatially and temporally, for each policy 
by simulating the effect that each policy has on the percent of each farmer‘s storage that 
is filled I also analyze how percent storage varies by reservoir size to determine if 
impacts vary by reservoir capacity. The cumulative impacts of unpermitted diversions on 
downstream permitted water users are also analyzed. I end the section by quantifying the 
tradeoffs between losses in bypass-flow days and agricultural water security under the 
different instream flow polices. 
 
4.4.1 Instream Flow Impacts 
In Table 4-6, the average number of bypass-flow days for impacted stream segments (i.e. 
streams segments downstream of a POD or containing a POD) that are below EOA, by 
precipitation year, are provided for the unimpaired (1), strict (5), moderate (6), and 
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unregulated (7) policy scenarios.
19
 The average number of bypass-flow days across all 
years is provided at the bottom of the table. Recall that a bypass-flow day occurs when 
flow within a stream segment exceeds the Qmbf threshold (Figure 4-2). The unimpaired 
scenario (1) provides the upper bound on the average number of bypass-flow days across 
all streams segments (23.37 days) because diversions are not allowed for this scenario. 
The strict scenario (5) follows closely behind with 23.35 days, the unregulated scenario 
(7) is next with 22.82 days, and the moderate scenario (6) has the smallest average 
number of bypass-flow days (22.79 days). 
The number of bypass-flow days for streams segments across the Maacama 
watershed are mapped for the dry year, 1981 (ranked 5), to illustrate the spatial 
heterogeneity of bypass-flow days (Figure 4-4). From the map, the stream segments in 
the upper reaches of the watershed are observed to have less bypass-flow days than those 
in the lower reaches. This is due to the fact that the bypass-flow threshold does not 
increase proportionally with the stream drainage area (refer to equation [4.6]); as such, 
flows downstream with larger drainage areas are more likely to meet the bypass-flow 
threshold than those further upstream. For example, streams in the upper parts of the 
watershed have between 4-6 bypass-flow days (highlighted in red) compared to streams 
further below with bypass-flow days up to 43 days (Figure 4-4). 
 
                                                 
19
 All averages for bypass-flow days and percent loss in streamflow are weighted by the length of the 
stream segments, i.e., weighted averages are calculated based on stream segment lengths. 
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TABLE 4-6. Average Bypass-Flow Days for Impacted Streams below EOA by 
Precipitation Year for the Unimpaired (1), Strict (5), Moderate (6), and Unregulated (7) 
Policy Scenarios. 
    
        Average Bypass-Flow Days per Scenario 
Rank Year Unimpaired Strict Moderate Unregulated 
Driest 1977 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
1976 1.058 1.048 0.913 0.979 
 
1972 4.559 4.558 4.082 4.023 
 
1964 7.912 7.902 7.305 7.233 
Dry 1981 13.165 13.158 12.600 12.813 
 
1979 16.146 16.136 15.523 15.675 
 
1968 17.829 17.781 17.195 17.232 
 
1962 19.601 19.555 18.915 19.135 
 
1966 18.448 18.438 17.845 17.586 
Moderate 1975 22.798 22.755 21.999 22.163 
 
1971 25.773 25.756 24.995 25.098 
 
1980 29.317 29.219 28.575 28.725 
 
1973 31.379 31.367 30.881 30.938 
 
1963 28.044 28.040 27.541 27.567 
Wet 1965 28.834 28.829 28.497 28.324 
 
1967 39.402 39.398 38.880 38.594 
 
1978 36.590 36.578 35.781 36.101 
 
1969 40.302 40.288 39.472 39.503 
 
1970 34.626 34.622 34.136 33.875 
Wettest 1974 51.639 51.635 50.654 50.821 
Average   23.371 23.353 22.789 22.819 
 
 
The total number of bypass-flow days depends not only on total annual flow, but 
also on the timing, size and the number of peak-flows. For example, a water year that 
experiences a few large peak-flows followed by many low-flows can achieve less 
bypass-flow days than a water year that has many medium-sized flows. This occurs,   
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FIGURE 4-4. Map of bypass-flow days for the unimpaired scenario (1) for all streams 
segments in the Maacama watershed for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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for instance, when precipitation follows the pattern of 1973 (ranked 13), which led to 
more unimpaired bypass-flow days on average (31.38 days) than the year 1965 (ranked 
15) with 28.83 days, even though the year 1965 had a total annual flow greater than that 
of year 1973 (Table 4-6). When flows are really low, such as during the driest year 1977, 
the unimpaired number of bypass-flow days is zero because flows never exceed the Qmbf 
threshold within any stream segment.  
For each policy scenario and precipitation year, I calculate the loss in average 
bypass-flow days relative to the unimpaired scenario (1) to determine the ecological 
impact of diversions under each regulatory regime (Table 4-7). The largest loss occurs 
for the moderate policy, where average bypass-flow days decrease from 23.37 days to 
22.79 days, for an average loss of 0.58 days (a decrease of 2.49%). The unregulated 
policy achieves a slightly smaller decrease relative to the unimpaired scenario of 2.36%, 
while the strict policy results in an average loss in bypass-flow days of only 0.08%. 
Overall, however, average losses in bypass-flows days for the alternative policy 
scenarios are not that different. 
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TABLE 4-7. Average Loss in Bypass-Flow Days Relative to the Unimpaired (1) 
Scenario for Impacted Streams below EOA by Precipitation Year for the Strict (5), 
Moderate (6), and Unregulated (7) Policy Scenarios. 
  
 
      
    Average Loss in Bypass-Flow Days per Scenario 
Rank Year Strict Moderate Unregulated 
Driest 1977 0.000 (N/A) 0.000 (N/A) 0.000 (N/A) 
 
1976 0.001 (0.93) 0.145 (13.67) 0.078 (7.41) 
 
1972 0.001 (0.02) 0.477 (10.46) 0.536 (11.80) 
 
1964 0.010 (0.12) 0.607 (7.67) 0.680 (8.59) 
Dry 1981 0.006 (0.05) 0.565 (4.29) 0.351 (2.67) 
 
1979 0.011 (0.07) 0.623 (3.86) 0.471 (2.92) 
 
1968 0.048 (0.27) 0.635 (3.56) 0.597 (3.35) 
 
1962 0.046 (0.23) 0.686 (3.50) 0.465 (2.37) 
 
1966 0.009 (0.05) 0.602 (3.26) 0.861 (4.67) 
Moderate 1975 0.043 (0.19) 0.798 (3.50) 0.634 (2.78) 
 
1971 0.017 (0.07) 0.778 (3.02) 0.675 (2.62) 
 
1980 0.098 (0.33) 0.742 (2.53) 0.592 (2.02) 
 
1973 0.012 (0.04) 0.498 (1.59) 0.441 (1.40) 
 
1963 0.004 (0.01) 0.503 (1.80) 0.477 (1.70) 
Wet 1965 0.005 (0.02) 0.337 (1.17) 0.510 (1.77) 
 
1967 0.004 (0.01) 0.522 (1.33) 0.807 (2.05) 
 
1978 0.012 (0.03) 0.809 (2.21) 0.489 (1.34) 
 
1969 0.014 (0.04) 0.830 (2.06) 0.800 (1.99) 
 
1970 0.004 (0.01) 0.491 (1.42) 0.751 (2.17) 
Wettest 1974 0.004 (0.01) 0.986 (1.91) 0.818 (1.58) 
Average   0.018 (0.08) 0.582 (2.49) 0.552 (2.36) 
 
 
Nonetheless, average losses in bypass-flow days are heterogeneous and vary by 
the catchment area of stream segments. Streams segments within smaller watersheds are 
the least likely to be impacted by diversions, but they experience the largest impacts 
(Table 4-8). For instance, under the unregulated policy, losses in bypass-flow days for 
impacted stream segments within the smallest watersheds experience the largest 
decrease of 8.95%, while streams in larger watersheds lose 1.73% and 1.32%, 
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respectively. However, most streams segments within small catchment areas (<1 mile 
squared) are unaffected by diversions: 57.29 miles of the total 77.71 miles (73.7%) in the 
watershed are unaffected by diversions (Table 4-8). This is because stream segments 
with small catchment areas are in the upper reaches of the watershed, and are less likely 
to be downstream of a POD, or to contain a POD. Meanwhile, all stream segments with 
catchment areas greater than 10 square miles are impacted because they are either 
downstream of a POD or contain a POD. The largest percent decrease in bypass-flow 
days occurs under the moderate policy within small catchment areas, with a loss of 
10.22%. On the other hand, the strict policy provides the greatest protection within small 
catchment areas, with a loss in bypass-flow days of only 0.49%. 
To further illustrate the spatial pattern of losses in bypass-flow days, I map 
bypass-flow days lost within the Maacama watershed for the year 1981for the 
unregulated policy (7) (Figure 4-5). The map clearly shows that the majority of streams 
segments in the upper reaches of the watershed are unaffected by diversions because 
they are upstream of PODs. However, most stream segments with larger catchment areas 
are downstream of PODs or contain a POD. Maps for losses in bypass-flow days under 
the strict and moderate policy scenarios are provided as well (Appendix B, Figures B-2 
and B-3, respectively). 
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TABLE 4-8. Average Bypass-Flow Days for the Unimpaired Scenario (1) and Loss in 
Bypass-Flow Days by Catchment Area for the Strict (5), Moderate (6), and Unregulated 
(7) Policy Scenarios Aggregated by Precipitation Years (only impacted streams below 
EOA). 
          
  Catchment Area (miles squared)   
Scenario <1 1-10 >=10 Average 
Unimpaired (1) 8.569 19.104 44.315 23.371 
Loss Strict (5) 0.042 (0.49) 0.007 (0.04) 0.005 (0.01) 0.018 (0.08) 
Loss Moderate (7) 0.876 (10.22) 0.413 (2.16) 0.470 (1.06) 0.582 (2.49) 
Loss Unregulated (9) 0.767 (8.95) 0.331 (1.73) 0.586 (1.32) 0.552 (2.36) 
Stream Length <1 1-10 >=10 Total 
Length (miles) Impacted Streams 20.42 (26.28) 22.90 (54.36) 19.10 (100.00) 62.41 (44.93) 
Length (miles) Unaffected Streams 57.29 (73.72) 19.22 (45.64) 0.00 (0.00) 76.51 (55.07) 
Length (miles) All Streams 77.71 42.12 19.10 138.92 
Note: Values in parenthesis equal the percent loss in average bypass-flow days relative to the unimpaired scenario, 
and the percentage of total stream length that is impacted and unaffected. 
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FIGURE 4-5. Map of losses in bypass-flow days under the unregulated policy scenario 
(7) for streams segments in the Maacama watershed for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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I plot the average percent loss in streamflow, for all impacted stream segments, 
across the twenty precipitation years, to better understand the impact of diversions on 
streamflows (Figure 4-6).
20
 Losses in flow are relative to the entire amount of flow 
measured for the migration period between October 1
st
 and April 30
th
. The largest 
differences in the amount of percent flow diverted across the various policy scenarios 
occur during the driest years (those years in the lowest quartile, ranked 1-4). For the 
driest year (1977), the moderate and strict policy scenarios lead to a zero percent loss in 
stream flow because the diversion thresholds are never met for any day during the 
migration period. However, for the unregulated policy, where diversions are not 
restricted, the average loss in streamflow for the driest year is close to 30% compared to 
the unimpaired scenario. The percent loss in flow for the moderate and unregulated 
policies converges in year 1979 (ranked 6), which implies that these two policies divert 
approximately the same amount of flow for most non-dry years (those above the first 
quartile). The strict policy, however, diverts less flow than the moderate and unregulated 
scenarios for most years except the wet years (the highest quartile years).  
 
                                                 
20
 The reduction in average percent loss in streamflow that is observed for the strict policy for year 1971 
(ranked 11) in Figure 4-6 is due to the fact that the several large peak-flow events exceeding the Qmbf 
threshold for this year occur prior to the diversion season (Dec 15
th
 – Mar 31st). 
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FIGURE 4-6. Average percent loss in streamflow for the strict (5), moderate (6), and 
unregulated (7) policy scenarios across precipitation years for impacted streams both 
above and below EOA. 
 
 
The percent loss in streamflow is heterogeneous across the watershed, where 
most streamflow impacts occur in the larger watersheds, while most stream segments in 
smaller watersheds remain unaffected by diversions (Table 4-9). For instance, 
approximately 82% (93.65 miles of the 114.62 miles in the watershed) of streams 
segments are unaffected by diversions in catchment areas less than 1 square mile. 
However, the largest impacts are observed in the smaller watersheds. For the 
unregulated policy, the average loss in streamflow for impacted streams within small 
watersheds is 11.99%, compared to 3.93% and 3.55% for streams with catchment areas 
between 1-10 and greater than 10 miles squared, respectively. Percent loss within 
smaller watersheds is considerably smaller under the strict policy than either of the two 
other policies. 
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TABLE 4-9. Average Percent Loss in Streamflow by Catchment Area for the Strict 
(5), Moderate (6), and Unregulated (7) Policy Scenarios Aggregated by Precipitation 
Years (only impacted streams, both above and below EOA). 
          
  Catchment Area (miles squared)   
Scenario <1 1-10 >=10 Average 
Strict (5) 3.502 1.306 1.166 1.995 
Moderate (7) 6.742 2.098 1.889 3.581 
Unregulated (9) 11.993 3.930 3.547 6.499 
Stream Length <1 1-10 >=10 Total 
Length (miles) Impacted Streams 20.96 (18.29) 22.90 (49.26) 19.10 (100.00) 62.70 (34.94) 
Length (miles) Unaffected Streams 93.65 (81.71) 23.59 (50.74) 0.00 (0.00) 117.24 (65.06) 
Length (miles) All Streams 114.62 46.48 19.10 180.20 
Note: Values in parenthesis equal the percentage of total stream length for impacted and unaffected streams. 
 
 
Overall, results suggest that the number of unimpaired bypass-flow days varies 
considerably both spatially and temporally. The strict diversion-guideline provides some 
benefit to protecting bypass-flow days, although, benefits are mostly within small 
watersheds. The moderate policy, however, does not provide more protection than 
unregulated diversions. In dry years, both the strict and moderate policies lead to 
considerable reductions in the percent loss in streamflow relative to the unregulated 
policy. However, since bypass-flow thresholds under unimpaired conditions are usually 
not met during dry years, reducing diversions during dry years does not necessarily lead 
to more bypass-flow days than under the unregulated policy. 
 
4.4.2 Agricultural Water Security Impacts 
As an indicator of agricultural water security, I use the percent storage filled at the end 
of the high flow season (April 30
th
). In Figure 4-7, I plot the average percent storage that 
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is filled for reservoirs in the watershed for different precipitation year under the strict 
(5), moderate (6), and unregulated (7) policies.
21
 The largest differences between the 
policies occur during the driest years (i.e., those in the lowest quartile). This is because 
the unregulated policy allows for diversions even under the driest years, while the 
moderate and strict policies place restrictions on diversions during these years (Figure 4-
6). In the wet years (i.e., highest quartile), the average percent filled was close to 100 
percent under all three policies (Figure 4-7), indicating high water security in wet years 
even under the strict policy. 
 
 
FIGURE 4-7. Average percent reservoir storage filled for policy scenarios strict (5), 
moderate (6), and unregulated (7) by precipitation year. 
 
 
The amount of water stored under the strict and moderate policy scenarios 
depends not only on the amount of total annual flow, but also on the size and timing of 
                                                 
21
 The reduction in average percent loss in streamflow that is observed for the strict policy for year 1971 
(ranked 11) in Figure 4-7 is due to the fact that the several large peak-flow events exceeding the Qmbf 
threshold for this year occur prior to the diversion season (Dec 15
th
 – Mar 31st). 
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peak-flows. For example, percent storage drops considerably for the strict policy in year 
1971 (ranked 11). The reason is that most peak-flows exceeding the bypass-flow 
threshold in 1971 occur prior to the diversion period that begins on December 15
th
, and 
thus, diversions during these early peak-flows are not allowed. The moderate policy, on 
the other hand, is only slightly affected by this because some flows during the diversion 
period exceed the February-median-flow (Qfmf) threshold, which is a lower threshold 
than the Qmbf threshold (Figure 4-2). As such, water security can be impaired under a 
moderate rainfall year if the timing of peak-flow events occurs outside the diversion 
period. 
The impact of diversions guidelines on water security is heterogeneous and 
varies by POD location and reservoir size. This heterogeneity is especially observed for 
the strict policy, where PODs with small catchment areas are impacted the most (Table 
4-10). Specifically, PODs with catchment areas less than one square mile experience the 
greatest reduction in average percent storage (from 95.0% under unregulated conditions, 
to 66.0% under the strict policy); meanwhile, PODs with large catchment areas (> 10 
miles squared) achieve a percent storage of 95% or irrespective of the policy.  
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TABLE 4-10. Average Percent of Storage Filled by POD Catchment Area for the Strict 
(5), Moderate (6), and Unregulated (7) Policy Scenarios Averaged across Precipitation 
Years. 
 
        
  POD Catchment Area (miles squared)   
Scenario <1 1-10 >10 Average 
Strict (5) 66.0 86.2 95.0 71.8 
Moderate (6) 86.1 93.5 95.0 88.0 
Unregulated (7) 95.0 99.2 100.0 96.1 
Total Capacity (ac-ft) 1441.8 328.3 125.4 1895.6 
 
 
The variation in percent storage for the strict policy is clearly observed in a map 
for the year 1981 (ranked 5) (Figure 4-8), where PODs located further upstream tend to 
have lower percent storage values than those further downstream. For the moderate and 
unregulated policies, variation in percent storage across the watershed for the year 1981 
tends to be less pronounced, especially for the unregulated policy (Appendix B, Figures 
B-4 and B-5, respectively). 
As for reservoir size, larger reservoirs have lower water security than smaller 
reservoirs, especially under the strict policy (Table 4-11). For the unregulated policy, 
reservoirs with different sizes tend to have similar values for percent storage filled: 
97.4% for reservoirs with less than 10 ac-ft in capacity, 96.6% for those between 10-50 
ac-ft, and 91.0% for reservoirs greater than 50 ac-ft. However, under the strict policy, 
large reservoirs above 50 ac-ft in size are the least water secure. Their average percent 
storage decreases from 91.01% under the unregulated policy, to 53.77% under the strict 
policy. 
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FIGURE 4-8. Map of percent storage filled for reservoirs in the Maacama watershed for 
the strict policy scenario (5), for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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TABLE 4-11. Average Percent of Storage Filled by Reservoir Size for the Strict (5), 
Moderate (6), and Unregulated (7) Policy Scenarios Averaged across Precipitation 
Years. 
          
  Reservoir Capacity (ac-ft)   
Scenario <10 10-50 >50 Average 
Strict (5) 77.0 72.5 53.8 71.8 
Moderate (6) 90.3 88.9 78.9 88.0 
Unregulated (7) 97.4 96.6 91.0 96.1 
Total Capacity (ac-ft) 189.5 591.6 1114.5 1895.6 
 
 
The presence of upstream diversions reduces the amount of water available to 
downstream water users, thus potentially decreasing their water security. I measure the 
cumulative impact of upstream unpermitted diversions on permitted waters users by 
calculating the loss in their percent storage filled. This impact is evaluated across all 
policy scenarios and water years. In Table 4-5, I defined the policy scenarios strict (2), 
moderate (3), and unregulated (4), where only permitted diversions are allowed to divert 
(i.e., unpermitted diversions are absent). Hence, these three scenarios can be used to 
simulate the percent storage filled for each permitted water user in the absence of 
unpermitted diversions for the different policies, and compared to the strict (5), moderate 
(6), and unregulated (7) policy scenarios that allow both permitted and unpermitted 
diversions. I measure the impact on permitted water users under each policy by 
comparing the values for percent storage filled when unpermitted diversions are not 
allowed versus allowed. For example, for the set of permitted water users, I calculate the 
difference in percent storage filled for each reservoir between the strict policy scenarios 
2 versus 5. This provides the loss in percent storage filled, under the strict policy, for 
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each permitted water user as a result of unpermitted diversions. Similarly, I perform the 
difference in percent storage filled for the moderate policy scenarios, 3 versus 4, and the 
unregulated policy scenarios, 4 versus 7. 
The results for the impact analysis of unpermitted diversions on permitted 
diversions are provided in Table 4-12. Recall that there are a total of 35 permitted 
diversions and 35 unpermitted diversions within the Maacama watershed (Table 4-3). 
Overall, the results show that losses in percent storage can be large; however, few 
permitted water users are affected. The impacts that occur are generally in dry years or 
under the strict policy. Impacts are observed for seven out of twenty years under the 
strict policy, for three of the dry years under the moderate policy, and only once for the 
unregulated policy in the driest year (1977). Impacts are rare for the unregulated policy 
because the majority of water users are able to meet their water needs even in the 
presence of upstream diversions. On the other hand, under the strict and moderate 
policies, upstream diversions can make it more difficult for downstream water users to 
meet the necessary diversion thresholds to divert water, especially during dry years.  
For instance, for the dry year 1976 (ranked 2), only one permitted water user is 
affected for the strict policy; three permitted water users are affected for the moderate 
policy; and no permitted water users are affected for the unregulated policy. For this 
same year, the average loss in percent storage filled for affected permitted water users 
equals 6.85% for the strict policy, 27.88% for moderate policy, and 0% for the 
unregulated policy. The largest loss in percent storage equals 42.27%, which occurs for 
the dry years 1981, 1979, and 1968 under the strict policy, and for the year 1972 for the 
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moderate policy. Impacts vary across water years due to the timing and magnitude of 
peak-flows. 
 
TABLE 4-12. Cumulative Impacts of Unpermitted Diversions on Permitted Diversions. 
                      
    Strict Moderate Unregulated 
Rank Year 
number 
affected 
number 
unaffected 
average 
loss in % 
storage 
filled 
(affected) 
number 
affected 
number 
unaffected 
average 
loss in % 
storage 
filled 
(affected) 
number 
affected 
number 
unaffected 
average 
loss in % 
storage 
filled 
(affected) 
Driest 1977 0 35 0.00 0 35 0 2 33 23.60 
  1976 1 34 6.85 3 32 27.88 0 35 0.00 
  1972 0 35 0.00 1 34 42.27 0 35 0.00 
  1964 2 33 12.93 1 34 41.43 0 35 0.00 
Dry 1981 1 34 42.27 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1979 1 34 42.27 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1968 1 34 42.27 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1962 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1966 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
moderate 1975 1 34 28.21 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1971 2 33 10.75 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1980 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1973 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1963 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
Wet 1965 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1967 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1978 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1969 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
  1970 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
Wettest 1974 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 0 35 0.00 
 
 
For example, under the strict policy, there are three separate permitted water users that 
are affected at least once by upstream diversions. Two of these water users are affected 
in 1964 (ranked 4), but are not affected in the years 1962 (ranked 8) and 1966 (ranked 
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9). However, both are affected again in 1971 (ranked 11). Recall that the year 1971 
experiences a rainfall pattern that leads to a large decrease in overall water security for 
the strict policy (Figure 4-7). As such, the likelihood of impacts is not based only on the 
total annual flow for a water year, but also on the timing and size of flows. 
There are several reasons why a permitted water user may not be affected by the 
presence of unpermitted diversions throughout the drainage network: 1) there are no 
unpermitted diversions located upstream from a permitted water user; 2) the permitted 
water users achieves 100% of their capacity even in the presence of upstream 
unpermitted diversions; 3) the permitted water user is not allowed to fill due to policy 
restrictions on diversions, even when upstream diversions are not allowed; and 4) 
unpermitted water users are not allowed to fill due to restrictions on diversions, thus 
causing no impact on downstream permitted water users. The first reason is the most 
common. The highly branched network of stream segments, and the distribution of 
reservoirs across the landscape, is such that the majority of PODs for permitted water 
users are not located downstream from unpermitted diversions (Figure 4-3). Hence, 
while the reduction in percent storage caused by unpermitted diversions can be large, 
most permitted water users are not affected. The second reason commonly occurs in wet 
years, when there is sufficient water to meet the needs of most water users, while the 
third and fourth reasons are most common during dry years. 
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4.4.3 Tradeoffs between Bypass-Flows and Agricultural Water Security 
I quantify and graph the tradeoffs between losses in bypass-flows and agricultural water 
security by comparing the average number of bypass-flow days with the average percent 
storage filled for the unimpaired (1), strict (5), moderate (6), and unregulated (7) policy 
scenarios (Figure 4-9). Overall, the strict policy provides slightly greater protection of 
bypass-flow days than the moderate and unregulated policies, but significantly reduces 
water security relative to these two policies. The strict policy results in an overall percent 
loss in an average bypass-flow days of 0.08%, while the moderate and unregulated 
policies lead to reductions in bypass-flow days of 2.49% and 2.36%, respectively (Table 
4-7). Meanwhile, for the strict and moderate policies, average percent storage decreases 
by around 25 and 10 percentage points, respectively, relative to the unregulated policy 
(Figure 4-9). 
Interestingly, the moderate policy provides lower agricultural water security than 
the unregulated policy, and yields a larger loss in the average number of bypass-flow 
days (a decrease of 2.49%) than the unregulated policy (2.36%) (Table 4-7). Note, the 
vertical axis in Figure 4-9 is set to start at 22.70 days rather than 0 days to better 
highlight the lower number of bypass-flow days for the moderate policy than for the 
unregulated policy. 
 
 
 
 
 103 
 
FIGURE 4-9. Average bypass-flow days versus average percent storage filled for the 
unimpaired (1), strict (5), moderate (6), and unregulated (7) policy scenarios aggregated 
by precipitation years. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Findings highlight the high spatial and temporal variability of flows in the Maacama 
watershed, which has important implications for both ecological processes and 
agricultural water users. Without the presence of any diversions, the number of days in 
which salmon bypass-flows are met within stream segments of the Maacama watershed 
is both spatially and temporally heterogeneous. The average number of unimpaired 
bypass-flow days for streams segments in the upper reaches (< 1 mile squared) is 8.6 
days, while for streams segments further downstream (>= 10 miles squared), the number 
of bypass-flow days is 44.3 (Table 4-8). This spatial variation is well illustrated in the 
mapping of bypass-flow days across the Maacama watershed (Figure 4-4). Bypass-flow 
days vary with the precipitation year as well, generally tending to increase with greater 
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annual flow. For the twenty precipitation years, the minimum average number of bypass-
flow days is 0, while the largest is 51.6 days (Table 4-6). As such, precipitation patterns 
significantly influence the variation in the number of bypass-flow days.  
Although the impact of diversions on bypass-flow days is larger within small 
catchment areas than within large watersheds, the extent of impacts on flows is smaller 
within smaller watersheds than within larger watersheds. For instance, under the 
unregulated policy, the percent loss in the average number of bypass-flow days within 
large watershed areas (>=10 miles squared) is 1.32%, while the percent loss in average 
bypass-flow days within small watersheds (<1 mile squared) is 8.95% (Table 4-8). This 
highlights that watershed size plays an important role in determining the relative impact 
of diversions on bypass-flow days. However, at the same time, 73% of streams segments 
within small watersheds, and below EOA, are not impacted by diversions, while all 
streams segments within large watersheds (>= 10 miles squared) are impacted (Table 4-8 
and Figure 4-5). As such, the impact of diversions on bypass-flow days is greater in 
small watersheds, but stream segments in the upper reaches are less likely to be affected 
because most are not downstream of PODs. 
Results suggest that the strict diversion-guideline provides spatially 
heterogeneous improvements in the number of bypass-flow days across the Maacama 
watershed when compared to the unregulated policy. Across all water years and streams 
segments, the strict policy yields on average 2.28% (2.36% - 0.08%) (Table 4-7) more 
bypass-flow days than the unregulated policy. However, within small watersheds, the 
improvement is 8.46% (8.95% - 0.49%), while within large watersheds, it reduces to 
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1.31% (1.32% - 0.01%) (Table 4-8). As such, the strict diversion-guideline provides 
greater protection of bypass-flow days in the upper reaches than in the lower reaches of 
the watershed.  
Meanwhile, the moderate diversion-guideline does not provide an improvement 
in bypass-flow days across the watershed as a whole. Results suggest that the moderate 
policy leads to an overall decrease in bypass-flow days of 0.13% (2.36% - 2.49%) (Table 
4-7) relative to the unregulated policy. Within small catchment areas (<1 mile squared), 
the moderate policy leads to an additional decrease in bypass-flow days of 1.27% 
(8.95% - 10.22%) relative to the unregulated policy, as well as a decrease of 0.43% 
(1.73% – 2.16%) (Table 4-8) within medium sized watersheds (1-10 miles squared). For 
the larger watersheds (>= 10 miles squared), however, the moderate policy actually 
protects bypass-flow days slightly more than the unregulated policy, yielding an 
improvement of 0.26% (1.32% – 1.06%) (Table 4-8) in bypass-flow days.  
The moderate policy does not outperform the unregulated policy due to a 
combination of the diversion season and the February-median-flow threshold.  The 
moderate policy restricts all diversions to take place during the winter rainy season, from 
Dec15
th
 to Mar 31
st
, when most bypass-flow days usually occur. Meanwhile, the 
unregulated policy allows for diversions to begin on October 1
st
, prior to the start of the 
winter rainy season, which provides some protection against reductions in bypass-flow 
days. The more restrictive diversion season, combined with the fact that the moderate 
policy only requires that flows exceed the less stringent February-median-flow 
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threshold, not the bypass-flow threshold, lead to a perverse effect: the moderate policy 
does less to protect bypass-flows than the unregulated policy. 
Overall, in dry years, both the strict and moderate policies lead to considerable 
reductions in the percent loss in streamflow relative to the unregulated policy. However, 
since bypass-flow thresholds under unimpaired conditions are usually not met during dry 
years, reducing diversions during dry years do not necessarily lead to significantly more 
bypass-flow days than under the unregulated policy. For instance, losses in bypass-flow 
days for the moderate and unregulated policies are quite similar for dry years (ranked 1-
4), (Table 4-7 and Figure B-1), even though the percent of flow diverted for these two 
polices is different for these years (Figure 4-6).  
The level of agricultural water security attained by landowners is high under 
unregulated conditions for the majority of water years. For the drier years (lowest 
quartile), average percent storage for the year 1976 (ranked 2) is above 80%, while by 
1981 (ranked 5), average storage is almost 100% (Figure 4-7). Percent storage is large 
under dry years because the unregulated policy does not impose limits on diversions. For 
example, for the driest year (1977), the average streamflow loss under the unregulated 
policy is close to 30%, while under the moderate and strict policies losses are 0% 
(Figure 4-6). Water security under unregulated conditions is also relatively homogenous 
across reservoirs of different catchment areas and sizes, where reservoirs fill on average 
to above 90% across all categories (Table 4-8 and Table 4-9).   
The diversion-guidelines, however, limit the water security of landowners 
relative to the unregulated policy. The strict policy significantly reduces percent water 
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stored, achieving lower percent storage values than the moderate and unregulated 
policies for dry and moderate water years (Figure 4-7). The moderate policy yields lower 
levels of water storage relative to the unregulated policy only during dry years (Figure 4-
7). For precipitation years wetter than 1965 (ranked 15), all three policies divert 
approximately the same amount of flow (Figure 4-6), and thus achieve similar levels of 
water security in terms of percent storage (Figure 4-7). By and large, the strict policy 
leads to the largest overall reduction in landowner water security, while both the strict 
and moderate policies significantly reduce water security during dry years relative to the 
unregulated policy. 
The impact of the diversion-guidelines on water security is heterogeneous and 
varies by the POD location and reservoir size. PODs with smaller catchment areas (< 1 
mile squared) are located in the upper parts of the watershed, where headwater streams 
are found. Landowners located in these areas are more vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of regulations than waters users located further downstream. This is because the bypass-
flow threshold increases non-linearly with watershed size (equation [4.6]); as such, 
streamflows are less likely to meet the bypass-flow threshold in the upper reaches of the 
watershed, placing greater diversion restrictions on waters users in these parts of the 
watershed. For instance, PODs with a catchment area greater than 10 miles squared fill 
consistently above 95%, on average, under all three policies (Table 4-10). However, 
PODs with small catchment areas (<1 mile squared) fill on average to 66% under the 
strict policy versus 91.4% under the unregulated policy (Table 4-10). Since landowners 
with larger reservoirs require greater amounts of flow to meet their water needs, the size 
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of the reservoir also affects water security. The average percent storage for large 
reservoirs above 50 ac-ft in size decreases from 91% for the unregulated policy to 53.8% 
for the strict policy (Table 4-11). As such, this suggests that water management policies 
should account for the heterogeneous impacts across landowners.  
Unpermitted diversions can lead to a large reduction in the percent storage filled 
of permitted water users; however, results suggest that impacts are rare. The highly 
branched network of stream segments, and the distribution of PODs across the 
landscape, is such that the majority of PODs for permitted water users are not located 
downstream of unpermitted diversions (Figure 4-3). Hence, the majority of permitted 
water users are not affected by unpermitted water users. For those located downstream 
of unpermitted water users, most impacts occur during dry years or under the strict 
policy. For instance, the greatest number of impacted water users is observed in the year 
1976 (ranked 2), where three permitted water users are affected (Table 4-10). On the 
other hand, impacts occur most frequently under the strict policy, since unpermitted 
diversions can make it more difficult for downstream permitted water users to meet the 
bypass-flow diversion threshold. During wet years, however, the impacts of upstream 
diversions are reduced to zero since there is sufficient water available for all water users 
to meet their needs. 
Results from this study suggest that there exist inherent tradeoffs between 
instream flow protections and agricultural water security. Both of the diversion-
guidelines significantly reduce water storage, especially during dry years. However, the 
strict policy provides a small improvement in bypass-flow days across the watershed as a 
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whole, while the moderate policy provides no improvement in bypass-flow days. The 
strict policy achieves an average improvement in bypass-flow days of 2.28% over the 
unregulated policy (Table 4-7), but results in an average reduction of around 25% in the 
measure of agricultural water security (Figure 4-9). On the other hand, within smaller 
watersheds, the strict policy provides greater protection of bypass-flow days, exceeding 
the unregulated policy in bypass-flow days by 8.46% (Table 4-8). During wet years, the 
strict policy has a small impact on both bypass-flow days and water security (Table 4-7 
and Figure 4-7). Consequently, greater focus should be given to better managing 
instream flow protection in the smallest watersheds and meeting human water needs 
during dry years, when agricultural water security impacts are greatest. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
The protection of instream flows has become a necessity for maintaining ecosystem 
functions and preserving endangered species. Consequently, regulatory agencies are 
increasingly placing greater restrictions on water users in order to protect instream flows, 
which can have significant impacts on agricultural water users. It is important to 
quantify the tradeoff between environmental protection and agricultural water security to 
better understand the effect of regulations on both instream flows and agricultural water 
needs. Within decentralized water management systems, this can be challenging due to 
the spatial and temporal variation in water supply, the dispersed network of  water users, 
the cumulative impacts of diversions across the watershed, and the need to meet 
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instream flow requirements throughout the system of streams. The integrated modeling 
framework used in this study allows for such a comprehensive analysis. 
Results from this study suggest that the minimum-bypass-flow diversion-
guideline provides a certain level of protection against the adverse impacts of diversions, 
while the February-median flow guideline does not. The resulting losses in agricultural 
water security, however, are significant, especially during dry years under both policies, 
and under the strict policy for most years. The strict diversion-guideline is most effective 
in reducing the impact of diversions within the upper parts of the watershed, which 
provide critical habitat for juvenile salmon. Although both the strict and moderate 
diversion-guidelines reduce water security the most during dry years, results suggest that 
within wet years it is possible to protect bypass-flows without limiting agricultural water 
security. In addition, given the highly branched network of stream segments that exist 
within a decentralized management system, it may be possible to allow for additional 
onsite storage to meet agricultural needs without impacting existing water users.  
Part of the challenge to achieving the long-term sustainability of ecosystems and 
agriculture is to develop watershed management policies that effectively balance human 
and ecosystem needs, especially during drought years, when conflicts appear to be the 
greatest. This study provides greater insight and quantitative tools to address the 
complexity of managing environmental protection and human water user needs within 
unpredictable climates, such as Mediterranean regions. With the effects of global climate 
change likely to lead to an increase in the variability of fresh water supplies throughout 
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many regions of the world, approaches to analyzing water management policies within 
variable systems will be needed to better balance human and environmental needs. 
A limitation of the hydrologic model is that it models only surface flow 
diversions and does not account for the effects of groundwater pumping on streamflows. 
Specifically, the pumping of subsurface flows can potentially affect streamflow levels 
and thus affect aquatic ecosystems. However, since the need for groundwater resources 
for irrigation purposes are mostly during the summer months, surface flow diversions 
represent the principal threat to reductions in streamflows during the migration period. 
The evaluation of tradeoffs between bypass-flow days and agricultural water security 
could be improved if a quantifiable relationship between bypass-flow days and salmon 
abundance were available, as well as the relationship between agricultural water security 
and its value to farmers. Such information would provide greater insights into the 
tradeoffs between protecting instream flows and losses in agricultural water security 
resulting from instream flow policies. 
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CHAPTER V  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A growing awareness of the effect of agricultural production on the environment has led 
to the development of programs and policies to mitigate its adverse effects. Conservation 
programs, such as CRP and EQIP, have been developed to incentivize farmers to 
voluntarily adopt more environmentally friendly practices. In Essay I, or Chapter II, an 
aggregate measure of additionality (ATT) is estimated for cost-share programs for six 
conservation practices based on a farmer survey in Ohio. Results suggest that 
additionality is positive and statistically significant for all six conservation practices, 
where the ATT values are higher for field practices, such as conservation tillage and 
cover crops that can be applied across a whole field, than for those practices applied only 
within environmentally sensitive areas. As such, this difference in ATT values is 
expected given that practices within environmentally sensitive areas represent a smaller 
proportion of the total farm acreage. However, while enrollment in conservation 
programs achieve a positive ATT for all practice types, a comparison between the level 
of additionality between conservation practices, using the %ATT, reveals that certain 
practice types achieve higher percent additionality than others. In fact, percent 
additionality varies dramatically between practice types. The largest %ATT is found for 
hayfield establishment, filter strips, and cover crops, with a %ATT of around 90%, the 
practices grid sampling and grass waterways achieved approximately 65%, while 
conservation tillage had the lowest percent additionality of around 20%. While these 
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results are valuable for program managers in evaluating conservation program 
effectiveness, they provide only part of the analysis that is required. For example, it is 
important to evaluate not only increases in conservation effort, but also overall 
improvements in environmental benefits. Having quantifiable information on the actual 
improvement in environmental benefits per practice, coupled with additionality 
estimates, would provide greater insight into the effectiveness of conservation programs. 
 Meanwhile, in Essay II, or Chapter III, a new methodological approach is 
developed to disaggregate the additionality measure into two separate effects: the 
expansion of existing conservation practices versus the new adoption of conservation 
practices. To do so, the contributions of ―prior-adopters‖ and ―new-adopters‖ to the 
overall ATT are estimated for cost-share programs for six conservation practices. This 
consists of estimating the likelihood that enrolled farmers are prior-adopters or new-
adopters, as well as the relative contribution for each group to the overall ATT. Results 
of the decomposition of the ATT reveal several findings. First, the ATT for prior-
adopters is not significant for all practice types, implying that prior-adopters do not 
significantly expand the proportion of conservation acreage when receiving cost-share 
funding. This suggests that cost-share programs have no significant effect on the 
conservation of those who would have adopted the practice without funding (i.e., prior-
adopters). Second, decomposition estimates suggest that the differences in %ATT 
between practice types found in Chapter II are mainly driven by the fraction of enrolled 
farmers that are prior-adopters and new-adopters. Practice types that are estimated to 
have a large fraction of new-adopters, such as filter strips and hayfield establishment, 
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exhibit larger values for %ATT. Whether a practice has a large fraction of enrolled new-
adopters or not is believed to be driven by the opportunity costs associated with adopting 
the practice. For instance, hayfield establishment would result in a complete loss in grain 
crop yields for the length of the enrollment contract. Consequently, enrolled farmers 
should be less likely to adopt hayfield establishment without funding, and thus, a larger 
fraction of enrolled farmers are new-adopters for hayfield establishment. Overall, this 
suggests that a farmers‘ history in conservation adoption has a significant influence on 
additionality levels. 
 Regulatory agencies have been faced with the need to protect instream flows to 
sustain aquatic ecosystems. In response, instream flow polices have been developed that 
curtail agricultural water diversions, placing greater pressures on agricultural producers 
to meet their water needs. In Essay III, or Chapter IV, the effects of instream flow 
policies on agricultural water security and streamflows within a decentralized 
management regime are analyzed for a watershed in northern-California. Results 
highlight that watershed size plays an important role in determining the relative impact 
of diversions on bypass-flow days. The impact of diversions on bypass-flow days is 
larger in small watersheds; however, stream segments located in the upper reaches are 
less likely to be affected because most are not downstream of PODs (points-of-
diversion). Relative to the unregulated policy, the strict diversion-guideline provides 
greater protection of bypass-flows days within smaller watersheds; however, within 
larger watersheds, the amount of protection is not as significant. Meanwhile, the 
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moderate diversion guideline leads to an overall decrease in bypass-flow days when 
compared to the unregulated policy.  
With respect to agricultural water security, percent storage is high for the 
majority of water years and relatively homogenous across reservoirs of different 
catchment areas and sizes under the unregulated policy. Water security, however, 
decreases sharply under the diversion-guidelines. The strict policy significantly reduces 
percent storage, especially during dry and moderate years, while the moderate policy 
significantly decreases water security during dry years. In addition, the impact of the 
diversion-guidelines on water security is heterogeneous and varies by POD location and 
reservoir size. The impact of unpermitted diversions on permitted water users can also 
reduce the water security of permitted water users. However, because of the highly 
branched network of stream segments, and the distribution of PODs across the 
landscape, the majority of permitted PODs are not located downstream of unpermitted 
diversions. Hence, most permitted water users are not affected by unpermitted water 
users. Finally, results from this study suggest that greater focus should be given to better 
managing streamflow protection in the smallest watersheds, where percent losses in 
bypass-flow days are greatest, and meeting human water needs during dry years, when 
impacts on agricultural water security from instream flow policies are largest. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER II 
 
 
TABLE A-1. Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Non-Enrolled Farmers 
for Conservation Tillage. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 87 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 476 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Farm 
Revenue 
=1 if farm revenue 
exceeded $250,000 in 2009 
0.402 0.493 
 
0.284 0.451 0.119* 
Farm 
Horizon 
=1 if farm will be operated 
by family within the next 5 
years 
0.897 0.306 
 
0.882 0.323 0.014 
Age age 57.437 10.600 
 
56.300 11.621 1.136 
Education 
=1 if education exceeds 
high school 
0.540 0.501 
 
0.405 0.491    0.135* 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil texture 
is clay 
0.759 0.430 
 
0.767 0.423 -0.008 
=1 if dominant soil texture 
is loam or sandy 
0.241 0.430 
 
0.233 0.423 0.008 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.218 0.416 
 
0.210 0.408 0.008 
=1 if 10% - 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.299 0.460 
 
0.311 0.463 -0.012 
=1 if more than 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.483 0.503 
 
0.479 0.500 0.004 
Rented 
proportion of farm acreage 
rented in 2009 
0.477 0.337 
 
0.431 0.370 0.046 
Grain 
Crops 
proportion of farm acreage 
devoted to grain crops in 
2009 
0.942 0.147 
 
0.857 0.269     0.085** 
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TABLE A-1. Continued. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 87 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 476 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 0%-2% 
0.515 0.368 
 
0.582 0.389 -0.067 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 2%-6% 
0.405 0.353 
 
0.366 0.365 0.039 
proportion of farm acreage 
greater than 6% slope 
0.080 0.165 
 
0.052 0.130 0.029 
Farm Size 
natural log of total farm 
acreage operated in 2009 
6.148 0.986 
 
5.791 1.053 
    
0.357** 
Stream 
=1 if a river or stream 
borders or runs through the 
property 
0.644 0.482 
 
0.590 0.492 0.053 
Livestock 
=1 if managed livestock in 
2009 
0.402 0.493   0.517 0.500  -0.115* 
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-2. Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Non-Enrolled Farmers 
for Cover Crops. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 24 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 581 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Farm Revenue 
=1 if farm revenue 
exceeded $250,000 
in 2009 
0.375 0.495 
 
0.299 0.458 0.076 
Farm Horizon 
=1 if farm will be 
operated by family 
within the next 5 
years 
0.875 0.338 
 
0.878 0.328 -0.003 
Age age 52.417 11.244 
 
57.170 11.553 -4.754* 
Education 
=1 if education 
exceeds high school 
0.500 0.511 
 
0.422 0.494 0.078 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil 
texture is clay 
0.750 0.442 
 
0.768 0.423 -0.018 
=1 if dominant soil 
texture is loam or 
sandy 
0.250 0.442 
 
0.232 0.423 0.018 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of 
household income 
comes from farming 
0.125 0.338 
 
0.208 0.406 -0.083 
=1 if 10% - 50% of 
household income 
comes from farming 
0.208 0.415 
 
0.330 0.471 -0.122 
=1 if more than 50% 
of household income 
comes from farming 
0.667 0.482 
 
0.461 0.499 0.205* 
Rented 
proportion of farm 
acreage rented in 
2009 
0.452 0.336 
 
0.435 0.362 0.017 
Grain Crops 
proportion of farm 
acreage devoted to 
grain crops in 2009 
0.723 0.276 
 
0.881 0.248 -0.158* 
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TABLE A-2. Continued. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 24 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 581 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 0%-2% 
0.538 0.419 
 
0.568 0.384 -0.030 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 2%-6% 
0.383 0.396 
 
0.376 0.361 0.007 
proportion of farm acreage 
greater than 6% slope 
0.080 0.171 
 
0.056 0.135 0.024 
Farm Size 
natural log of total farm 
acreage operated in 2009 
5.929 0.822 
 
5.854 1.045 0.074 
Stream 
=1 if a river or stream 
borders or runs through the 
property 
0.667 0.482 
 
0.596 0.491 0.071 
Livestock 
=1 if managed livestock in 
2009 
0.833 0.381   0.468 0.499     0.365** 
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-3. Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Non-Enrolled Farmers 
for Hayfields. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 19 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 575 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Farm Revenue 
=1 if farm revenue 
exceeded $250,000 in 
2009 
0.158 0.375 
 
0.306 0.461 -0.148 
Age age 62.000 9.843 
 
56.887 11.677 5.113 
Education 
=1 if education exceeds 
high school 
0.579 0.507 
 
0.419 0.494 0.160 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil 
texture is clay 
0.789 0.419 
 
0.769 0.422 0.021 
=1 if dominant soil 
texture is loam or sandy 
0.211 0.419 
 
0.231 0.422 -0.021 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.263 0.452 
 
0.203 0.403 0.060 
=1 if 10% - 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.368 0.496 
 
0.320 0.467 0.048 
=1 if more than 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.368 0.496 
 
0.477 0.500 -0.108 
Rented 
proportion of farm 
acreage rented in 2009 
0.204 0.233 
 
0.446 0.361 -0.241** 
Grain Crops 
proportion of farm 
acreage devoted to grain 
crops in 2009 
0.657 0.416 
 
0.888 0.237 -0.230** 
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TABLE A-3. Continued. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 19 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 575 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 0%-2% 
0.402 0.414 
 
0.575 0.383 -0.173 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 2%-6% 
0.472 0.421 
 
0.375 0.361 0.097 
proportion of farm acreage 
greater than 6% slope 
0.125 0.262 
 
0.050 0.122 0.075* 
Farm Size 
natural log of total farm 
acreage operated in 2009 
5.244 1.268 
 
5.877 1.029 -0.633** 
Stream 
=1 if a river or stream 
borders or runs through the 
property 
0.579 0.507 
 
0.593 0.492 -0.014 
Livestock 
=1 if managed livestock in 
2009 
0.526 0.513   0.471 0.500 0.055 
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-4. Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Non-Enrolled Farmers 
for Grid Sampling. 
                  
  
Enrolled (N = 55 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 484 farmers) 
 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev   
Diff in 
Means 
Farm 
Revenue 
=1 if farm revenue 
exceeded $250,000 in 
2009 
0.455 0.503 
 
0.264 0.442 
 
  0.190** 
Farm 
Horizon 
=1 if farm will be 
operated by family 
within the next 5 years 
0.964 0.189 
 
0.868 0.339 
 
  0.096* 
Age age 55.800 11.557 
 
56.791 11.652 
 
 -0.991 
Experience 
years of farming 
experience 
31.091 12.532 
 
32.134 12.964 
 
-1.043 
Education 
=1 if education exceeds 
high school 
0.655 0.480 
 
0.413 0.493 
 
0.241** 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil 
texture is clay 
0.745 0.440 
 
0.758 0.429 
 
 -0.013 
=1 if dominant soil 
texture is loam or sandy 
0.255 0.440 
 
0.242 0.429 
 
  0.013 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of 
household income 
comes from farming 
0.109 0.315 
 
0.219 0.414 
 
 -0.110 
=1 if 10% - 50% of 
household income 
comes from farming 
0.400 0.494 
 
0.320 0.467 
 
  0.080 
=1 if more than 50% of 
household income 
comes from farming 
0.491 0.505 
 
0.461 0.499 
 
  0.030 
Rented 
proportion of farm 
acreage rented in 2009 
0.509 0.345 
 
0.424 0.365 
 
  0.086 
Grain Crops 
proportion of farm 
acreage devoted to grain 
crops in 2009 
0.967 0.085   0.858 0.269    0.108** 
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TABLE A-4. Continued. 
                  
  
Enrolled (N = 55 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 484 farmers) 
 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev   
Diff in 
Means 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 0%-2% 
0.468 0.361 
 
0.570 0.385 
 
-0.103 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 2%-6% 
0.447 0.335 
 
0.375 0.365 
 
0.072 
proportion of farm acreage 
greater than 6% slope 
0.086 0.145 
 
0.055 0.138 
 
0.030 
Farm Size 
natural log of total farm 
acreage operated in 2009 
6.296 0.910 
 
5.757 1.035 
 
0.539** 
Stream 
=1 if a river or stream 
borders or runs through the 
property 
0.564 0.501 
 
0.597 0.491 
 
-0.033 
Livestock 
=1 if managed livestock in 
2009 
0.400 0.494   0.490 0.500   -0.090 
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 133 
TABLE A-5. Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Non-Enrolled Farmers 
for Grass Waterways. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 146 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 380 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Farm 
Revenue 
=1 if farm revenue 
exceeded $250,000 in 2009 
0.377 0.486 
 
0.268 0.444 0.108* 
Farm 
Horizon 
=1 if farm will be operated 
by family within the next 5 
years 
0.904 0.295 
 
0.868 0.338 0.036 
Age age 56.404 10.725 
 
57.358 11.825 -0.954 
Education 
=1 if education exceeds 
high school 
0.479 0.501 
 
0.405 0.492 0.074 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil texture 
is clay 
0.801 0.400 
 
0.739 0.440 0.062 
=1 if dominant soil texture 
is loam or sandy 
0.199 0.400 
 
0.261 0.440 -0.062 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.226 0.420 
 
0.192 0.394 0.034 
=1 if 10% - 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.315 0.466 
 
0.337 0.473 -0.022 
=1 if more than 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.459 0.500 
 
0.471 0.500 -0.012 
Rented 
proportion of farm acreage 
rented in 2009 
0.460 0.336 
 
0.409 0.363 0.051 
Grain Crops 
proportion of farm acreage 
devoted to grain crops in 
2009 
0.941 0.147 
 
0.851 0.279   0.090** 
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TABLE A-5. Continued. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 146 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 380 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 0%-2% 
0.483 0.369 
 
0.620 0.384 -0.136** 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 2%-6% 
0.451 0.358 
 
0.333 0.362 0.118** 
proportion of farm acreage 
greater than 6% slope 
0.066 0.149 
 
0.048 0.127    0.018 
Farm 
Size 
natural log of total farm 
acreage operated in 2009 
6.141 0.928 
 
5.707 1.072  0.434** 
Stream 
=1 if a river or stream 
borders or runs through 
the property 
0.685 0.466 
 
0.561 0.497    0.0124** 
Livestock 
=1 if managed livestock in 
2009 
0.411 0.494   0.508 0.501 -0.097* 
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-6. Summary Statistics on Covariates for Enrolled and Non-Enrolled Farmers 
for Filter Strips. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 93 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 451 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Farm 
Revenue 
=1 if farm revenue 
exceeded $250,000 in 2009 
0.452 0.500 
 
0.262 0.440     0.190** 
Farm 
Horizon 
=1 if farm will be operated 
by family within the next 5 
years 
0.925 0.265 
 
0.863 0.345 0.062 
Age age 56.559 10.097 
 
57.098 11.890 -0.538 
Education 
=1 if education exceeds 
high school 
0.548 0.500 
 
0.392 0.489     0.156** 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil texture 
is clay 
0.763 0.427 
 
0.769 0.422 -0.006 
=1 if dominant soil texture 
is loam or sandy 
0.237 0.427 
 
0.231 0.422 0.006 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.194 0.397 
 
0.197 0.398 -0.004 
=1 if 10% - 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.323 0.470 
 
0.328 0.470 -0.006 
=1 if more than 50% of 
household income comes 
from farming 
0.484 0.502 
 
0.475 0.500 0.009 
Rented 
proportion of farm acreage 
rented in 2009 
0.502 0.328 
 
0.419 0.364  0.083* 
Grain Crops 
proportion of farm acreage 
devoted to grain crops in 
2009 
0.947 0.112 
 
0.856 0.273     0.091** 
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TABLE A-6. Continued. 
                
  
Enrolled (N = 93 farmers) 
 
Non-Enrolled (N = 451 farmers) 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Diff in 
Means 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 0%-2% 
0.574 0.357 
 
0.570 0.391 0.004 
proportion of farm acreage 
with slope 2%-6% 
0.365 0.330 
 
0.377 0.369 -0.012 
proportion of farm acreage 
greater than 6% slope 
0.061 0.118 
 
0.053 0.136    0.008 
Farm Size 
natural log of total farm 
acreage operated in 2009 
6.120 0.917 
 
5.746 1.068  0.374** 
Stream 
=1 if a river or stream 
borders or runs through the 
property 
0.839 0.370 
 
0.517 0.500  0.322** 
Livestock 
=1 if managed livestock in 
2009 
0.473 0.502   0.492 0.500 -0.019 
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-7. Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
for Cost-Share Enrollment in Conservation Tillage. 
   
Variable 
Estimated 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
Farm Revenue 0.218 0.192 
Farm Horizon 0.001 0.226 
Age 0.007 0.007 
Education   0.301* 0.137 
Soil Type: Loam or Sandy 0.052 0.160 
Medium Income -0.209 0.194 
High Income -0.282 0.200 
Rented 0.020 0.217 
Grain Crops  1.022* 0.432 
Medium Slope 0.201 0.189 
High Slope 1.127* 0.456 
Farm Size 0.110 0.108 
Stream 0.084 0.142 
Livestock -0.095 0.144 
Constant      -3.167** 0.779 
Log Likelihood -226.411   
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-8. Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
for Cost-Share Enrollment in Cover Crops. 
   
Variable 
Estimated 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
Farm Revenue 0.001 0.281 
Farm Horizon -0.383 0.334 
Age -0.017 0.010 
Education 0.248 0.216 
Soil Type: Loam or Sandy 0.106 0.248 
Medium Income 0.044 0.349 
High Income 0.437 0.322 
Rented 0.001 0.336 
Grain Crops  -0.981* 0.418 
Medium Slope 0.072 0.295 
High Slope 0.343 0.673 
Farm Size 0.193 0.160 
Stream 0.018 0.221 
Livestock     0.686** 0.250 
Constant -1.709 0.959 
Log Likelihood -86.500   
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-9. Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
for Cost-Share Enrollment in Hayfields. 
   
Variable 
Estimated 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
Farm Revenue 0.077 0.353 
Age 0.012 0.011 
Education 0.299 0.231 
Soil Type: Loam or Sandy 0.021 0.279 
Medium Income -0.054 0.304 
High Income 0.020 0.311 
Rented -0.696 0.413 
Grain Crops -0.685 0.395 
Medium Slope 0.430 0.310 
High Slope  1.393* 0.647 
Farm Size -0.067 0.148 
Stream -0.035 0.236 
Livestock -0.010 0.242 
Constant -1.868 0.958 
Log Likelihood -71.929   
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-10. Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
for Cost-Share Enrollment in Grass Waterways. 
   
Variable 
Estimated 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
Farm Revenue 0.146 0.174 
Farm Horizon 0.058 0.209 
Age -0.007 0.006 
Education 0.142 0.127 
Soil Type: Loam or Sandy -0.200 0.149 
Medium Income -0.341 0.179 
High Income    -0.472** 0.184 
Rented -0.215 0.205 
Grain Crops    1.068** 0.379 
Medium Slope     0.616** 0.172 
High Slope  0.962* 0.478 
Farm Size  0.228* 0.099 
Stream  0.284* 0.129 
Livestock -0.148 0.135 
Constant -2.59** 0.693 
Log Likelihood  -279.606   
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-11. Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores 
for Cost-Share Enrollment in Grass Waterways. 
 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
Farm Revenue 0.580** 0.194 
Farm Horizon     0.203 0.251 
Age     0.004 0.007 
Education     0.373** 0.142 
Soil Type: Loam or Sandy    -0.099 0.168 
Medium Income    -0.118 0.206 
High Income    -0.331 0.213 
Rented     0.143 0.228 
Grain Crops     1.657** 0.503 
Medium Slope    -0.032 0.199 
High Slope     0.333 0.546 
Farm Size    -0.045 0.103 
Stream     0.919** 0.160 
Livestock     0.128 0.156 
Constant    -3.509** 0.854 
Log Likelihood    -210.595   
Note: Statistical significance: 99% (**), 95% (*). 
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TABLE A-12. Average Treatment Effect on % ATT using Propensity Score Kernel 
Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 0.02). 
  
    Conservation Tillage Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.1351 0.0338 0.0693 0.2019 
% ATT 17.3 3.9 9.5 24.9 
Matched enrolled farmers = 86, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 476 
Cover Crops Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2220 0.0500 0.1364 0.3216 
% ATT 84.8 9.1 66.1 95.5 
Matched enrolled farmers = 24, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 581 
Hayfield Establishment Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.2232 0.0677 0.0690 0.3398 
% ATT 91.1 9.8 62.6 96.4 
Grid Sampling Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.5067 0.0580 0.3503 0.5788 
% ATT 66.7 5.9 50.3 73.4 
Matched enrolled farmers = 54, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 484 
Grass Waterways Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0121 0.0023 0.0078 0.0165 
% ATT 65.5 6.7 49.8 76.0 
Matched enrolled farmers = 144, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 380 
Filter Strips Estimate Std. Error 95% Bootstrapped CI 
ATT 0.0101 0.0020 0.0064 0.0141 
% ATT 89.6 5.7 74.7 95.9 
Matched enrolled farmers = 92, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 451 
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TABLE A-13. Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals for Pair-wise Differences in 
%ATT using Propensity Score Kernel Matching (Kernel Type: Gaussian, Bandwidth = 
0.02) (Row minus Column). 
               
      
  
Conservation 
Tillage 
  
Cover Crops   
Hayfield 
Establishment 
  
Grid 
Sampling 
  
Grass 
Waterways 
  Filter Strips 
Conservation 
Tillage 
- 
 
[-82.0, -46.4]* 
 
[-81.9, -45.1]* 
 
[-58.0, -30.7]* 
 
[-60.5, -29.1]* 
 
[-82.6, -55.4]* 
Cover Crops   [46.4, 82.0]* 
 
- 
 
[-26.0,  24.9] 
 
[0.6, 40.1]* 
 
[-2.9, 39.5] 
 
[-22.9, 15.0] 
Hayfield 
Establishment 
  [45.1, 81.9]* 
 
[-24.9, 26.0] 
 
- 
 
[-2.3,    41.1] 
 
[-3.8, 40.7] 
 
 [-26.0, 16.1] 
Grid Sampling   [30.7, 58.0]* 
 
[-40.1,    -0.6]* 
 
[-41.1,   2.3] 
 
- 
 
[-18.9, 16.0] 
 
[-40.6,    -8.8]* 
Grass 
Waterways 
  [29.1, 60.5]* 
 
[-39.5,   2.9] 
 
[-40.7,   3.8] 
 
[-16.0, 18.9] 
 
- 
 
[-41.7, -5.9]* 
Filter Strips   [55.4,  82.6]*   [-15.0, 22.9]   [-16.1,    26.0]   [8.8,  40.6]*   [5.9,  41.7]*   - 
Note: * denotes statistical significance of the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
APPENDIX B 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER III 
 
TABLE B-1. Bivariate Probit Model on Vineyard and Reservoir Development for the 
Period 1973-1993. 
      
Variable 
  Vineyard development equation Coefficient Standard Error 
Average slope -0.0293** 0.0042 
Growing-degree days  0.1992** 0.0387 
Elevation (x1000)        -0.1351 0.3303 
Floodplain         0.1247 0.1335 
Distance to nearest highway        -0.0282 0.0174 
Riparian access a   
  Mainstem 0.6964** 0.1743 
  Seasonal stream        -0.0322 0.0676 
Geology type b   
  Old alluvium         0.0288 0.1133 
  Volcanic        -0.2695* 0.1333 
  Franciscan        -0.2568 0.1371 
Constant        -3.8563** 0.6857 
   Reservoir construction equation Coefficient Standard Error 
Average slope        -0.0360** 0.0036 
Growing-degree days         0.0261 0.0164 
Elevation (x1000)         0.6673* 0.2650 
Floodplain         0.1025 0.1681 
Distance to nearest highway        -0.0188 0.0129 
Riparian access a   
  Mainstem        -0.1072 0.2468 
  Seasonal stream 0.3453** 0.0731 
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TABLE B-1. Continued. 
      
Reservoir construction equation Coefficient Standard Error 
Geology type b   
  Old alluvium 0.5555** 0.1593 
  Volcanic 0.5332** 0.1732 
  Franciscan 0.6867** 0.1828 
Constant        -1.9657** 0.3274 
   
 
 
0.3440** 0.0457 
   N = 3561 Ln L= -1784.15   
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level 
a Riparian access baseline type = No stream access 
b Geology baseline type = Young alluvium 
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FIGURE B-1. Average loss in bypass-flow days across precipitation years for scenarios 
5 (Strict), 6 (Moderate), and 7 (Unregulated) (only impaired streams below EOA). 
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FIGURE B-2. Map of losses in bypass-flow days under the strict policy scenario (5) for 
streams in the Maacama watershed for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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FIGURE B-3. Map of losses in bypass-flow days under the moderate policy scenario (6) 
for streams in the Maacama watershed for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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FIGURE B-4. Map of percent storage filled for reservoirs in the Maacama watershed for 
the moderate policy scenario (6), for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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FIGURE B-5. Map of percent storage filled for reservoirs in the Maacama watershed for 
the unregulated policy scenario (7), for the dry year 1981 (ranked 5). 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Dear Ohio Farm Operator, 
 
The Ohio Field Office of the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) is 
conducting a survey of Ohio farmers on behalf of The Ohio State University (OSU) and 
Texas A&M University (TAMU). This survey aims to learn about conservation 
practices, including those paid for entirely by farmers and those receiving cost-share 
support. There is growing interest in the relationship between agricultural practices and 
water quality improvements. This study will provide important information to guide 
future policies and programs. 
 
We ask that the principal farm operator answer this survey. The survey is expected to 
take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary, and you may 
discontinue at anytime. Please return it in the enclosed postage paid return envelope. 
 
As a token of our appreciation, one respondent will be chosen at random to receive a 
$200 gift card from Home Depot. If you complete the survey and are selected as the 
winner, the NASS will send you the gift card prize that we will provide.  You do not 
need to do anything else to be eligible for the prize. In addition, completing the survey is 
a benefit to you since you are helping policy makers and farm leaders make better 
decisions about designing conservation programs in the future. Even if you have never 
participated in a cost-share program, your response is extremely valuable to provide 
accurate information on the range of farming practices.  
 
The information you provide will be completely confidential. The Ohio Field Office of 
the NASS will conduct the survey and no identifying information that can be linked to 
your individual farm will be provided in the data files given to the researchers at OSU 
and TAMU. The results from this study will be reported only in aggregate form, such 
that you and your farm can not be individually identified in any research results. If you 
have any questions about the risks associated with this survey you can contact The Ohio 
State University Office of Responsible Research Practices at 614-688-8457. 
 
We thank you for your time and effort in answering the survey. Our contact information 
is provided below if you have any questions regarding this survey.  
 
Sincerely, 
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Brent L. Sohngen  
The Ohio State University 
Department of Agricultural, Environmental,  
and Development Economics 
2120 Fyffe Rd. 
Columbus, OH 43210-1067 
(614) 688-4640  
 Sohngen.1@osu.edu 
Richard T. Woodward 
Texas A&M University  
Department of Agricultural Economics 
College Station, TX 77843-2124 
(979) 845-5864   
r-woodward@tamu.edu 
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Instructions  
 
We ask that the principal decision-maker of the farm business answer this survey. We 
would appreciate that you answer each question with the answer you believe is most 
representative for your farm.   
 
1. Did you operate a farm business in 2005?     Yes        No  
2. Did you operate a farm business in 2009?     Yes        No  
 
If your answer is NO to either question 1 or question 2, please stop here and return the 
uncompleted survey in the enclosed envelope. Postage is paid by the survey project.  
 
Section A: Farmer Characteristics  
A1.  What is your age? ____________ 
A2.  How many years have you operated a farm? ____________ 
A3.  What was the last year of school you completed? 
   Did not graduate from high school 
   High school graduate or GED 
   Attended college, but did not complete degree 
   Completed technical school/community college 
   College graduate 
   Masters or doctoral degree 
 
A4.  Five years from now, which of the following do you think will be most likely? 
   I will still be operating the farm.  
   The farm will be operated by one or more relatives (children or other relative).  
  The farm will be operated by non-related farmer. 
   The farm will be converted into non-farm use  
   Do not know  
 
Section B: Farm Operations 
B1.  Where is most of your farm located?      
 County:  ____________________       
 Township: __________________        
 Zip Code:  __________________ 
B2.  Is your farm located in the GREAT MIAMI RIVER WATERSHED (including the 
subwatersheds of the Lower Miami, the Mad, the Upper Miami, or the Stillwater 
Rivers)? 
   Yes     No      Don‘t know    
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B3. Of the acres in your farming operation, how many were owned and how many were 
rented?  
 Acres in 2009 Acres in 2005 
Owned by you 
________________ ________________ 
Rented from others  
(cash or share rent) ________________ ________________ 
 
B4. Of the acres in your farming operation, how many acres were used for each of the 
following? 
Land Use Acres in 2009 Acres in 2005 
Grain Crops  
(corn, soybean, wheat etc.) ______________ ______________ 
Hay, forage or pasture ______________ ______________ 
Other crops ______________ ______________ 
Other uses 
(woodland, wildlife, buildings, 
etc.) ______________ ______________ 
B5. Of the acres in your farming operation in 2009, how much falls into each of the 
following slope classes?  
Flat (0-2% slope) __________ acres  
Gently rolling (2-6% slope)? __________ acres 
Hilly (greater than 6%)? __________ acres 
 
B6. "HEL," or highly erodible land, is land that has an erodibility index of 8 or more as 
designated by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS).  
Is any of the land that you operate classified as HEL?   
  Yes     No      Don‘t know    
 
B7. Is any of the land you operate certified with the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in order 
to qualify for government payments under Federal support programs? 
   Yes     No  
 
 IF YES, is there any acreage in your conservation plan that is NOT ELIGIBLE for 
payment under NRCS programs for conservation practices?  For example, areas that do not 
have the required cropping history cannot receive cost-share support for grass waterways. 
   Yes, some land is NOT eligible           No      Don‘t know  
 
 IF YES, how many acres are NOT eligible for NRCS programs?  
___________ acres. 
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B8. How would you characterize the dominant soil texture on your farm? (mark one) 
  Clay  Clay loam  Silty loam 
  Loam  Sandy loam  Sandy  
 
B9. Is there a river or stream (permanent or intermittent) that borders or runs through the 
largest property that you operate? 
   Yes      No 
 
 IF NO, how far is closest stream or river?   ________feet  or  ______ 
miles 
 
B10. Did you manage livestock on your farm in either 2005 or 2009?   
   Yes        No 
 
 If YES, what was the MAXIMUM number of animals, regardless of ownership, 
managed by you in during these years? 
 Animals in 2009 Animals in 2005 
Dairy cattle and calves   
(both dry and in milk) ________________ ________________ 
Beef cattle and calves  ________________ ________________ 
Hogs and pigs ________________ ________________ 
Poultry including layers, 
broilers and turkeys ________________ ________________ 
Horses ________________ ________________ 
 
B11.  What was your gross revenue ($ from farm sales) in 2009? 
Under $25,000  
$25,000 - $49,999  
$50,000 - $99,999  
$100,000 - $249,999  
$250,000 - $499,999  
$500,000 - $999,999  
$1,000,000 & over  
B12. What percent of your household income was earned FROM FARMING or ranching 
in 2009? 
 Low (0-10%) 
 Moderate (11-50%) 
 High (51% or more) 
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B13. Indicate what interactions you have with staff from your county‘s Soil and Water 
Conservation District and/or Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) 
office.  (check all that apply) 
 Never 
 Newsletters or bulletins 
 Meetings or seminars 
 Infrequent personal contact (one time per year) 
 Occasional personal contact (several times per year). 
 Frequent personal contact (every month or more) 
 
Section C: Awareness of Conservation Cost-share Programs 
In this section we ask you about several programs that provide support for conservation 
practices. 
 A B C D 
Program Have you heard 
about this 
program? 
If YES to A, 
have you ever 
applied to this 
program? 
If YES to B,  
have you 
received cost-
share payment 
from this 
program?  
If YES to C,  
indicate the 
period(s) during 
which you applied 
for cost-share from 
this program. 
Environmental Quality 
Incentive Program (EQIP) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Before 2002 
 2003-2005 
 20062009 
Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP)  
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Before 2002 
 2003-2005 
 20062009 
Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program 
(CREP) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Before 2002 
 2003-2005 
 20062009 
Conservation Security 
Program (CSP) 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Before 2002 
 2003-2005 
 20062009 
Great Miami River 
Watershed Water Quality 
Trading Program (WQTP) 
managed by the Miami 
Conservancy District  
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
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Section D: Conservation Practices and Cost-share Funding 
In this section we ask about several conservation practices that you may have used at 
some time. 
 
D1.  Please complete BOTH columns A and B.  
If you have never used a practice, check NO in both columns.  
 A B 
Conservation Practice Did you use this practice in 
2009?  If so, indicate the 
extent of the practice. 
Have you CHANGED the extent  
of your use of this practice 
SINCE 2005? 
Conservation Tillage 
(No-Till or Reduced Tillage 
so that 30% or more of the 
soil surface  is covered with 
crop residue after planting) 
 No   
 Yes   _____ acres 
  No 
  Increased by _____acres 
  Decreased by _____acres 
Grass Waterways  
 
 No   
 Yes   _____ acres 
  No 
  Increased by _____acres 
  Decreased by _____acres 
Filter Strips along streams 
 
 No   
 Yes   _____ Length (ft) 
              _____ Avg. Width 
  No 
  Increased by _____feet 
  Decreased by _____feet 
Manure Lagoon, Storage 
Facility, or Livestock 
Wastewater Collection 
System 
 No   
 Yes  _____ gallons 
  No 
  Increased by _____gallons 
  Decreased by _____gallons 
Cover Crops planted after row 
crop harvests 
 No   
 Yes   _____ acres 
  No 
  Increased by _____acres 
  Decreased by _____acres 
Hayfield or Grassland 
Established as a conservation 
practice 
 No   
 Yes   _____ acres 
  No 
  Increased by _____acres 
  Decreased by _____acres 
Grid Sampling and Reduced 
Fertilizer Application 
 No   
 Yes   _____ acres 
  No 
  Increased by _____acres 
  Decreased by _____acres 
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We also are interested in whether you received cost-share support for the practices in 
question D. We list some of the sources that may have provided financial 
assistance. 
 EQIP: Environmental Quality Incentive Program 
 CRP: Conservation Reserve Program 
 CREP: Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program 
 CSP: Conservation Security Program 
 WQTP: Great Miami River Watershed Water Quality Trading Program 
 
D2. Complete only the rows for practices that you indicated you have used in 
QUESTION D. 
 A B C D 
Conservation Practice Have you 
ever 
RECEIVED 
cost-share 
support to 
implement 
this 
practice? 
IF YES TO A, 
indicate the name(s) 
of the programs. 
(Check all that 
apply). 
IF YES TO A, 
during which 
period(s) did you 
ENROLL in a cost 
share program? 
(Check all that 
apply). 
IF YES TO A, 
indicate the dollar 
amount or cost-
share percentage 
of your MOST 
RECENT 
agreement. 
Conservation Tillage 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$_____ 
or 
______% 
 Don‘t know 
Grass Waterways  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$_____ 
or 
_____% 
 Don‘t know 
Filter Strips along streams 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$_____ 
or 
_____% 
 Don‘t know 
Manure Lagoon, Storage 
Facility or Livestock 
Wastewater Collection 
System 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$_____ 
or 
_____% 
 Don‘t know 
Cover Crops planted after 
row crop harvests 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$_____ 
or 
_____% 
 Don‘t know 
Conversion of cropland to 
hay or grassland  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$_____ 
or 
_____% 
 Don‘t know 
Grid Sampling and 
Reduced Fertilizer 
Application 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 EQIP   CRP 
 CREP   CSP 
 WQTP   Other 
 2002 or before 
 2003 – 2005 
 2006 - present 
$____________ 
or 
_________% 
 Don‘t know 
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Section E: Views on Environmental Issues 
What is your immediate reaction to the following 
statements? 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
E1. No one has the right to tell farmers what 
practices to use on their land.  
     
E2. Farmers have a responsibility to society to 
reduce the causes of water pollution that 
originate on their farms.  
     
E3. Water pollution is a major problem in Ohio.       
E4. When compared with conventional tillage, 
CONSERVATION TILLAGE tends to make 
yields vary more from one year to the next  
     
E5. It would be acceptable for a city to pay a 
farmer to reduce water pollution instead of 
reducing pollution directly at its waste water 
treatment plant. 
     
E6. I often try new methods on my farm, before 
most of other farmers in my region. 
     
E7. Applying for cost-share tends to be a time 
consuming process. 
     
E8. The design specifications and implementation 
required by cost-share programs are quite 
restrictive. 
     
E9.Federal cost-share programs require contracts 
with long-term commitments, making them 
less attractive. 
     
 
 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE OPTIONAL: 
If you have any comments, you may add them here. 
 
If you are willing, please provide a contact name and phone number in case there is a 
need to clarify some of your survey responses. Please note that this information would 
be given to the researchers at The Ohio State University and Texas A&M University, 
meaning that your responses to the survey would no longer be anonymous. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your cooperation.   
Please return the survey in the enclosed postage paid return envelope to  
Brent Sohngen 
The Ohio State University 
Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics 
2120 Fyffe Rd. 
Columbus, OH 43210-1067 
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